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THE LAST TEMPTATION OF CONGRESS:




On April 4, 201Z Congress passed the STOCK Act, which officially
banned the practice of insider trading by members of Congress and formally
declared them to be fiduciaries for purposes of federal insider trading law.
The impetus for the legislation was the perception, held by a majority of com-
mentators, that insider trading by members of Congress did not violate fed-
eral securities law because they were not fiduciaries to anyone. In this
Article, I make the case that the majority view was and continues to be
wron& and why that matters. Specifically, I argue that even if the STOCK
Act had not passed and even if it were to be repealed, judges could build on
existing precedents and employ unextraordinary judicial reasoning to impose
the requisite fiduciary duties on legislators. In Part 1, I provide a succinct
summary of federal insider trading law, focusing on the controversial ele-
ment as applied to legislators-the existence and breach of fiduciay duty. I
then explore the standard approach taken by courts in resolving novel in-
stances of potentialy fiduciary relationships: traditional analogical reason-
ing to well-established cases. In Part II, I employ this standard approach to
make the case that judges could find legislators to befiduciaries under federal
insider trading law. In Part III, I more deeply justify the analogical reason-
ing employed in Part I. Specryically, I show that one core purpose offiduci-
ary law has been to fight public corruption and that legislator insider
trading could be classsfied as a form of public corruption. This analysis
helps reveal an organic alignment between recognizing legislator insider trad-
ing as a breach offiduciary duty and an important goal of the common law
of fiduciaries-that of deterring cornuption. Part IV addresses various
objections.
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INTRODUCrION
On September 18, 2008, at 7 p.m., Treasury Secretary Henry Paul-
son and Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke met with
members of Congress in a closed-door briefing that was so secretive
even cell phones were banned.' Among those attending was Repre-
sentative Spencer Bachus, the ranking Republican on the House Fi-
nancial Services Committee.2 As Paulson recounts:
Ben [Bernanke] emphasized how the financial crisis could spill into
the real economy. As stocks dropped perhaps a further twenty per-
cent, General Motors would go bankrupt, and unemployment
1 60 Minutes: Congress: Trading Stodk on Inside Information? (CBS television broadcast
Nov. 13, 2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7388130n.
2 Bachus became Committee Chairman following the Republican congressional vic-
tories of 2010. PETER ScHwEIzER, THRoW THEM ALL Our 24 (2011).
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would rise .. . if we did nothing. . . . It [was] a matter of days,
[Bernanke] said, before there [would be] a meltdown in the global
financial system.3
According to Paulson, these dire predictions left members of
Congress "ashen-faced."4 The very next day, Representative Bachus
invested in option funds designed to rise in value when markets fall.5
Just four days later, he sold, making more than $5,000 in profit, nearly
doubling his investment. 6 As a 60 Minutes television report put it:
"While Congressman Bachus was publicly trying to keep the economy
from cratering, he was privately betting that it would . . . ."
Did Representative Bachus engage in what I refer to as "legislator
insider trading"-the trading by members of federal or state legisla-
tures on the basis of material nonpublic information acquired
through their positions? Did he trade on information learned in the
closed-door briefing? Or was the timing of his trade mere coinci-
dence? Although he was cleared of ethical wrongdoing by the Office
of Congressional Ethics,8 we may never know the truth behind
Bachus's suspicious trades.
Publicity surrounding Bachus's trades, however, did focus public
attention to what was widely perceived as a gaping loophole in the
federal securities laws. That loophole, according to a majority of com-
mentators opining on the issue,9 was that federal insider trading laws
generally did not reach members of Congress.10 For example, as for-
3 HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRmK 259 (2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
4 Id
5 SCuWEIZER, supra note 2, at 28.
6 j4
7 Congress: Trading Stock on Inside Information?, supra note 1.
8 Mary Orndorff, US. Rep. Spencer Bachus Cleared in Ethics Investigation, AL.cou (Apr.
30, 2012, 6:42 PM), http://blog.al.com/sweerhome/2012/04/usjrep-spenceribachus
cleared.html. Although Bachus defended his trade by noting that information about the
dire state of the economy was generally known to the public, in my view, that is surely not
the relevant market-moving information in question. The relevant market-moving infor-
mation was the fact that both the Treasury Secretary and Chair of the Federal Reserve
Board convened a secret emergency meeting proposing unprecedented governmental in-
tervention to avert economic disaster.
9 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Inside the Beltway, 36 J. Cone. L. 281,
295-96 (2011) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway] (describing the "predominant
view"); Andrew George, Note, Public (Self)Semice. Illegal Trading on Confidential Congressional
Information, 2 HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 161, 163 (2008) (describing the "conventional wis-
dom"); infra note 10.
10 For examples of the majority view, see RicHARD W. PAINTER, GErlNG TH{E GOVERN
MENT AMERIcA DEsERvEs: How Encs REFoRm CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE 163 (2009) ("In-
sider trading law ... may not be sufficiently rigorous to prevent abuses by government
officials."); Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway, supra note 9, at 285 ("[T]he quirks of the relevant
laws almost certainly would prevent members of Congress from being successfully prose-
cuted."); Iuider Trading and Congressional Accountability: Hering Before the S. Comm. on Home-
land Sec. & Gov't Affais, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement ofJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Professor
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mer Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Ar-
thur Levitt maintained, members of Congress "benefit from an
exemption that the average investor doesn't benefit from. They're
immune from insider trading laws.""1
To be clear, Levitt was not referring to an explicit statutory ex-
emption like the one that was drafted in Title VII.12 Rather, this so-
called immunity flowed from the difficulty of establishing the breach
of a fiduciary (or fiduciary-like) 3 duty, a required element of an in-
of Law, Columbia Univ.) [hereinafter Coffee Testimony] (agreeing with Professor Bain-
bridge); Matthew Barbabella et al., Insider Trading in Congress: The Need for Regulation, 9J.
Bus. & SEC. L. 199, 200 (2009) (noting that legislator insider trading that looks the same as
corporate insider trading is nonetheless legal); Bud W. Jerke, Comment, Cashing in on
Capitol Hill: Insider Trading and the Use of Political Intelligence for Pfit, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
1451, 1483 (2010) (concluding that "current law does not support holding government
insiders . .. liable for insider trading without substantially manipulating current doctrine");
AlanJ. Ziobrowski et al., Abnormal Returns from the Common Stoce Investments of the U.S. Senate,
39J. FiN. & QuANrrATvE ANALYsIs 661, 676 (2004) ("Current law does not prohibit Sena-
tors from trading stock on the basis of information acquired in the course of performing
their normal Senatorial functions.").
For examples of the minority view, see Insider Trading and Congressional Accountability:
Iearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (state-
ment of Donald C. Langevoort, Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.) (arguing
that federal insider trading law does not exempt legislators or anyone else); Jonathan R.
Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Essay, Regulation and Scholarship: Constant Companions or Occa-
sional Bedfellows?, 26 YAuz J. oN REa. 89, 107 (2009) (arguing that a prohibition on legisla-
tor insider trading is legally plausible and intuitively appealing); Donna M. Nagy, Insider
Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties ofEntrustment, 91 B.U. L. REv. 1105, 1138 (2011)
(arguing that the majority view is rooted in "twin misconceptions") [hereinafter Nagy, Con-
gressional Officials]; George, supra note 9, at 163 (arguing that congressional insider trading
is illegal under misappropriation theory).
To be sure, there is earlier scholarship that concludes that government officials are
covered by federal insider trading laws. However, those articles did not focus on the dis-
tinction between elected and appointed officials, which distinction is critical to the major-
ity view. See, e.g., Herbert T. Krimmel, The Government Insider and Rule l0b-5: A New
Aplicationfor an ExpandingDoctrine, 47 S. CAi. L. REv. 1491, 1492, 1503-04 (1974); Donald
C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70
CAuF. L REv. 1, 34-35 (1982) [hereinafter Langevoort, A Post-Chiarella Restatement].
II Bloomberg Surveillance: Arthur Levitt, Board Member, Bloomberg LP (Bloomberg Radio
broadcast Oct. 13, 2010) (transcript available through Analyst Wire, 2010 WLNR
20471195).
12 Originally, Tide VII exempted Congress from anti-discrimination and other
workforce protection laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006) (excluding the "United States"
from the definition of "employer"). Subsequent statutes have closed this loophole. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16 ("Employment by Federal Government").
In addition, Section 3(c) of the Exchange Act, which grants immunity from the fed-
eral securities laws to certain government entities, only applies to an employee or official
when such employee or official is "acting in the course of his official duty." See Krimmel,
supra note 10, at 1492. As such, legislator insider trading, which is clearly not an exercise
of office, is not covered by the immunity. Id.
13 As explained in Part I.A.2.a. below, the breach of a fiduciary or other duty arising
out of a similar relation of trust and confidence, the latter of which I refer to as a "fiduci-
ary-like duty," will satisfy this element. Throughout this Article, when referring to "fiduci-
ary duty," I also include analogous duties imposed due to a relation of trust and
confidence.
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sider trading violation. According to this majority view, unlike em-
ployees of the three branches of federal government, who are agents
and thus unquestionably subject to federal insider trading laws,14
members of Congress are fiduciaries to no one.'5 Members are
"neither employees nor agents of any larger entity."16
Because of this majority understanding, President Obama called
for a new law banning insider trading by members of Congress in his
2012 State of the Union address.' 7 And Congress, after dragging its
feet for years,' 8 responded to public pressure and finally enacted the
14 There is almost no disagreement that employees of the three branches of federal
government are fiduciaries and thus subject to federal insider trading laws. See e.g.,
PAINTER, supra note 10, at 166 (discussing the application of insider trading laws to Execu-
tive Branch employees); Bainbridge, Inside the Betway, supra note 9, at 297 ("Under current
law, no serious doctrinal obstacle precludes applying misappropriation theory to employ-
ees of Congress, the Executive Branch, and other governmental agencies.").
15 See Coffee Testimony, supra note 10, at 4 ("Members of Congress do not dearly owe
a fiduciary duty (or any similar duty requiring them to be loyal and hold information in
confidence) either to their trading partners in a securities (or commodities) transaction or
to the source of the material, nonpublic information."); PAINTER, supra note 10, at 175
("Today, federal securities law prohibits securities trading on information misappropriated
from most other workplaces, including government workplaces, yet Congress has appar-
ently managed to create sufficient ambiguity around fiduciary obligations of members and
their employees that the rules may not apply to them."); Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway,
supra note 9, at 295 (ultimately rejecting the suggestion that "the electorate" is the benefici-
ary of a fiduciary obligation by members of Congress because "[w]hat is needed under
insider trading law is either a duty to the person with whom one trades or to the source of
the information, not some generalized duty to members of the public in the abstract");
Barbabella et al., supra note 10, at 215, 217 ("In the case of Congressional insider trading,
... it is not clear that congressmen or their aides owe any party such a duty in more than a
vague sense.... One imagines that this lack of a concrete duty, rather than the vague
sense that congressional representatives ought to place public interests first, might control
if a congressional representative were sued for trading on material nonpublic legislative
information under the current legal regime."); Jerke, supra note 10, at 1483-88 (arguing
that government insiders lack the requisite fiduciary duty under classical theory and noting
the lack of consensus about whether members of Congress are employees of the federal
government for purposes of misappropriation theory).
The same "non-fiduciary" argument could be made about any elected official--e.g.,
president, vice president, governors, elected city officials, elected judges--as well as certain
appointed officials-e.g., state and federal judges. This Article, however, focuses on fed-
eral and state legislators, although it cites to precedent establishing the fiduciary status of
other elected officials. See infra Part ILD.2. As a general matter, presidents and vice presi-
dents tend to voluntarily comply with the financial conflicts of interest statutes, which re-
quire divestment of holdings in certain situations. See PAmirEa, supra note 10, at 61-62.
For an argument that judges are fiduciaries, see Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael
Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging 101 CauU. L REv. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at
15) [hereinafter Leib et. al, Fiduciary Themy of Judging], available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2029001.
16 Coffee Testimony, supra note 10, at 5.
17 See President Baradk Obama's State of the Union Address, N.Y. TRIES, Jan. 24, 2012, at 9,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/25/us/politics/state-of-the-union-2012-transcriptbtml
?refhstateoftheunionmessageus ("Send me a bill that bans insider trading by members of
Congress; I will sign it tomorrow.").
18 Representatives Brian Baird (Democrat, Washington) and Louise Slaughter (Dem-
ocrat, New York) previously introduced versions of the Stop Trading On Congressional
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Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK
Act),' 9 which affirmed Congress's nonexemption from federal insider
trading laws20 and declared that members owe the requisite fiduciary
duties to Congress, the federal government, and US citizens.21 In
other words, members and employees of Congress are fiduciaries for
purposes of insider trading law, and trading on material nonpublic
information acquired in the course of official duties is deemed a
breach of fiduciary duty.
Given this legislative intervention, one might think that nothing
interesting remains to be said about legislator insider trading or the
fiduciary status of legislators. But we should not overread the Act's
significance and scope. First, the STOCK Act did not address the fidu-
ciary status of elected officials at the state or local level. There are
7,382 members of state legislatures22 who are not covered by the
STOCK Act and may be trading on inside information right now. If
the majority view remains intact for state legislators,23 then they are
not violating federal securities law because they are not breaching any
fiduciary duty. Indeed, a Minnesota state legislator recently blogged:
"It is, in fact, completely legal for a state lawmaker to use confidential
information gained at the [state] Capitol for personal gain."24
Although members of Congress may have more access to juicier
nonpublic information than "mere" state legislators, we should not
Knowledge Act in the 109th, see H.R. 5015, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006); 110th, see H.R.
2341, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); and 111th Congresses, see H.R. 682, 111th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2009).
19 STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C. app.). The STOCK Act passed in the Senate on a 96-to-3 vote on Feb.
2, 2012. Scott Wong, STOCK Act Passes Senate by Vote of 96-3, POLITICO (Feb. 3, 2012, 3:31
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72391.html. The House passed their
version of the STOCK Act by a 417-to-2 vote on Feb. 9, 2012. Seung Min Kim, STOCK Act
Passed by House by Vote of 417-2, POLITICO (Feb. 9, 2012, 3:39 PM), http://
www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72670.htin. On April 4, 2012, President Obama
signed the STOCKAct into law. Matt Compton, President Obama Signs the STOCKAct, THE
Wim HousE BLOG (Apr. 4, 2012, 5:16 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/04/
04/president-obanmasigns-stock-act.
20 STOCK Act § 4(a).
21 See id. § 4(g)(1); see also id. § 4(b)(1) (stating the purpose of the amendment); id.
4(b) (2) (codifying a duty of "trust and confidence" for members and employees of Con-
gress by amending 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1). Corresponding provisions cover executive and judi-
cial branch officers and employees. For simplicity, I use the term "fiduciary duty" to
include similar duties arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence.
22 See Number of State lgislators and Length of Terms (in Years), NATiONAL CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGIsLArTREs, http://www.ncst.org/legislatures-elections/legislators-legislative-stff-
data/number-of-legislators-and-length-of-terms.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
23 Not only did the STOCK Act fail to address state legislators, but the Act itself makes
clear that it shall not "impair or limit the construction of" the existing securities antifraud
provisions. STOCK Act §§ 4(g)(3), 10.
24 Joe Atkins, Insider Trading It's Time to Close a Surprising Loophole, INVER-
GRovEHErorrsPAcH (Dec. 16, 2011, 12:30 PM), http://invergroveheights.patch.com/
blog-posts/insider-trading-its-time-to-close-a-surprising-loophole.
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discount the opportunities that legislators of states with influential
economies and important corporate domiciliaries might exploit. For
example, consider a California state legislator who hears that a new
state bill forcing internet retailers (such as Amazon.com and Over-
stock.com) to collect sales taxes will soon be introduced.25 Or con-
sider a Minnesota state legislator who learns about a bill that would
authorize the operation of gaming machines by Canterbury Park
Holding Corporation, a publicly traded gaming corporation based in
Minnesota.26 Might a legislator trade on such nonpublic information?
Given the great number of state legislators, it would be foolish to dis-
miss the risk of their trading.
Second, the relevant provisions of the STOCK Act only addressed
federal insider trading laws. As a result, the majority view, if left un-
corrected, could influence the judicial interpretations of other federal
or state laws that are similarly premised on the breach of fiduciary
obligation. For example, the majority of circuits currently require
that the defendant must have breached a fiduciary obligation27 to the
defrauded person or entity in order to be found guilty under the hon-
est services mail fraud statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346.28 If the
logic of the majority view is correct, then elected officials in those cir-
cuits cannot be prosecuted for honest services mail fraud. By contrast,
if the logic of the majority view is wrong, then elected officials would
be subject to prosecution, which result would be more consistent with
precedents that do not sharply distinguish between elected and ap-
pointed officials.29
25 Cf Marc Lifsher, Internet Sals Tax Bill Advances in Caifornia Legislature Los ANGELES
Tmsss (May 31, 2011, 4:41 PM), http://latinesblogs.latimes.com/money-co/2011/05/
internet-sales-tax-bill-advances-in-california-legislature.html (reporting the advancement of
just such a bill).
26 Cf Atkins, supra note 24 (noting that Canterbury Park Holding Company "has seen
its stock suddenly soar and swoon based on action at the State Capitol").
27 See Samantha Hunter, Honest Services Fraud and thetFiduciary Relationship Requirement:
How the Ninth Circuit Got It Wrong in United States v. Milovanovic, 2012 BYU L. REV. 509,
514-15 (2012) ("The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held that
honest services fraud requires the defendant to have breached a fiduciary duty to the vic-
tim, while the Second and Eighth Circuits have rejected such a requirement. The Ninth
Circuit [also rejects the requirement] . .. ." (citations omitted)).
28 Honest services fraud refers to "any scheme or artifice to defraud" by "depriv[ing]
another of the intangible right of honest services" through the use of the mails. 18 U.S.C.
$ 1341, 1346 (2006).
2o For examples of these precedents, see United States v. Weybrauch, 548 F.3d 1237,
1248 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversing the district court's exclusion of evidence against a member
of the Alaska House of Representatives and holding that the honest services mail fraud
statute "establishes a uniform standard for 'honest services' that governs every public offi-
cial"), vacated 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010); United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1169
(11th Cir. 1997) (reversing the district court's exclusion of evidence against an elected
member of the Board of County Commissioners and noting that "[e]lected officials gener-
ally owe a fiduciary duty to the electorate"); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.
1974) (per curiam) (upholding conviction of former Governor of Illinois); Shushan v.
2013] 851
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In sum, the STOCK Act makes an important statutory clarifica-
tion that members of Congress are fiduciaries who owe the requisite
duties under federal insider trading law. However, we should not mis-
read the STOCK Act as contradicting the majority view or rendering it
entirely moot. Indeed, the Act could be cited as support for the cor-
rectness of the majority view-that legislators are not fiduciaries and
thus not covered by the federal ban on insider trading, absent some
statutory override. After all, if the majority view were not seen as cor-
rect, why would it have been necessary for Congress to enact the
STOCK Act at all? If, however, the majority view is wrong, it remains
important not to canonize a mistaken understanding of the law.
To that end, I argue that the majority view-that judges could not
recognize legislators as fiduciaries under federal insider trading law-
has been and continues to be wrong.30 Even if the STOCK Act had
not passed and even if it were to be repealed, judges could build on
existing precedents and employ unextraordinary judicial reasoning to
impose the relevant fiduciary duties on both state and federal legisla-
tors as required under federal insider trading law.
In Part I, I provide a clean distillation of federal insider trading
law that focuses on the critical element of the violation: the breach of
fiduciary duty. I then explore courts' standard approach in resolving
novel instances of potentially fiduciary relationships: applying tradi-
tional analogical reasoning to well-established cases. For centuries,
courts have invoked-either explicitly or implicitly-analogies to
more established fiduciaries as the primary means of deciding hard
cases.
United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941) (upholding mail fraud prosecution of a
member of a Louisiana parish levee board for receiving kickbacks and noting that "[no
trustee has more sacred duties than a public official").
30 When I refer to the "majority view," I am referring to the opinion or implication
that judges must take extraordinary measures (e.g., ignore or overrtle existing judicial
precedent, or use novel or unusual judicial methods) in order to find legislators actionable
under pre-STOCK Act federal insider trading law. Stated another way, the majority view
that I am challenging is one that suggests that there are greater obstacles to holding legisla-
tors liable under federal insider trading law than the mere lack of direct "on point" prece-
dent-the fact that no other court has yet found a legislator to be a fiduciary in an insider
trading case. At the same time., I acknowledge that any attempt to ascribe a "majority view"
label to any cluster of commentators whose characterizations and conclusions are diverse
will be vulnerable to a "straw-man" criticism. No doubt some commentators, which I have
categorized as falling under the "majority view," did not address the precise issue as I have
framed it and were instead asking and answering a slightly different question (e.g., whether
members of Congress were "clear" or "established" fiduciaries). Regardless of the how the
issue has been framed by various commentators, my Article emphasizes two important
points that can't be ignored in the debate. First, the fiduciary category has never been a
fixed one with precise boundaries. Second, the Supreme Court has long referred to analo-
gous duties imposed due to a relation of trust and confidence. This recognition of fiduci-
ary-like relationships signals flexibility in defining the reach of the insider trading
prohibition.
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In Part II, I employ analogical reasoning to make the case that a
fiduciary duty could be found to apply to both federal and state legis-
lators. This would have been true for members of Congress prior to
the passage of the STOCK Act, but more importantly, it remains true
for state legislators who are not now covered by the STOCK Act. My
target audience is the judiciary who may be confronted with just such
a question in a lawsuit. In addition to analogical reasoning, I summon
an impressive body ofjudicial precedent which has recognized public
officials, including state and federal legislators, as fiduciaries outside
of the insider trading context.3 1
Deeper thinkers, whether they be judges or academic commenta-
tors, may find the analysis in Part II to be unsatisfyingly thin. They will
likely object that the problem with analogical reasoning is that it is
often conclusory and indeterminate. For example, there is no widely
accepted rule that tells us which of the myriad attributes of a person,
object, or concept are relevant for comparison and how much weight
should be given them.32 Even a zebra and a barber pole are analo-
gous if we are focused on being "striped."33 To make analogies not
merely rhetorically persuasive but also well reasoned, there must be
some appeal, explicit or implicit, to the underlying purpose of the
analogical reasoning.
Part III provides a thicker rationale for recognizing legislators as
fiduciaries for purposes of insider trading law. It more deeply justifies
the analogies made in Part II by identifying a core purpose of fiduci-
ary duty law. Although wildly heterogeneous, fiduciary law holds, as
one of its central principles, an anti-corruption norm, with corruption
(in the public sector) defined as the "use of public office for private
gain."3 4 After explaining why legislator insider trading should be clas-
sified as a form of public corruption, I demonstrate the existence of
this anti-corruption norm in fiduciary law by exploring judicial opin-
ions which have proscribed public fiduciaries from using their public
office for private gain. In the end, this analysis reveals an organic
alignment between recognizing legislator insider trading as a breach
of fiduciary duty and one core purpose of the common law of fiducia-
ries-deterring corruption.
31 Also, I perform an analysis of SEC Rule 10b5-2(b). See infra Part II.C..
32 See Gregory L. Murphy & Douglas L. Medin, The Role of Theories in Conceptual Coher-
ence, 92 PsYcoHo. REv. 289, 292 (1985) ("The point is that any two entities can be arbitrarily
similar or dissimilar by changing the criterion of what counts as a relevant attribute. Un-
less one can specify such criteria, then the claim that categorization is based on attribute
matching is almost entirely vacuous. . .
3 Id.
34 Part III.B duplicates Part II of Sung Hui Kim, What Governmental Insider Trading
Teaches Us About Corporate Insider Trading, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADNm (Ste-
phen M. Bainbridge ed., forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 1, 14-27) [hereinafter Kim,
Governmental Insider Trading] (on file with author).
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In Part IV, I answer objections that the judicial extension of a
federal securities cause of action against legislators would be unwise
or unconstitutional. Specifically, I discuss whether doing so would
amount to judicial activism, violate principles of federalism (with re-
spect to state legislators), or violate the Speech or Debate Clause.35
To clarify, this Article's primary purpose is to determine whether
judges can rely on ordinary judicial reasoning to impose the relevant
fiduciary duties on state and federal legislators under federal insider
trading law and how this might be done. It is not to inquire, on some
blank slate, whether legislator insider trading should be banned on
policy grounds, which is a matter considered in a separate piece.36
For curious readers, I can share that I believe that legislator insider
trading is normatively problematic on consequentialist grounds. But
these policy views are not logically germane to the arguments I make
here.37
I
FEDERAL INSIDER TRAnING LAw
A. Federal Insider Trading Doctrine
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Section
10(b))3 and SEC Rule lOb-5 (Rule 1Ob-5) 39 promulgated thereunder
by the SEC proscribe fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security."* Although neither the text of Section 10(b) nor that
3 Due to the space constraints of this Article, the objections sounding in separation
of powers or the First Amendment are explored in a separate appendix, which is available
online at the Social Science Research Network. See Sung Hui Kim, Appendix to The Last
Temptation of Congress: Legislaior Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corrption
(Nov. 5, 2012). available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2171336.
36 See generaly Kim, Governmental Insider Trading, supra note 34, at 61 (arguing that
governmental insider trading-including such trading by legislators-inflicts temptation,
distraction, and legitimacy costs, thereby militating in favor of its banning).
3 To clarify this point with an analogy, suppose that I am a chef who wants to publish
a recipe to show how home cooks can make a decadent Southern Chicken Fried Steak. It
is entirely possible for me to write a clear, concise, and delicious recipe, regardless of my
personal views about whether or not people should eat steak prepared in this manner.
Indeed, I can be perfectly agnostic about whether any individual-for health or other rea-
sons-should cook or eat steak without necessarily undermining the quality of the recipe.
In fact, I can rule out steak in my own diet and still write a useful recipe. In short, my
personal normative views about whether anyone should consume steak are not logically ger-
mane to the usefulness of my recipe. Further, I can answer objections to the recipe (e.g.,
Why did you include safflower oil in the recipe when coconut oil has a better smoking
point?) with reasons based on policies widely accepted by most chefs, regardless of my own
normative views. For readers curious about my normative views on steak, I can share that I
am a "pescetarian," which is neither here nor there.
3 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (2006).
39 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5 (2012).
40 Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) makes it
unlawful for any person purchasing or selling securities "[to use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
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of Rule lOb-5 specifically mentions "insider trading," courts and ad-
ministrative agencies have, for decades, interpreted these provisions
to ban the practice.4 1  In rough terms,42 the elements of an insider
trading cause of action include: (1) trading on (or tipping) (2) mate-
rial, (3) nonpublic information (4) in breach of a fiduciary (or fiduci-
ary-like) duty.4 3 These elements, including the fiduciary requirement,
appear nowhere in a statute or administrative regulation. They have
vance." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Similarly, Rule 10b-5, which was promulgated by the SEC
under its regulatory authority granted by Congress under the Exchange Act, provides, inter
alia, that no person may "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud ... or ... engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
41 See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,651-56 (1997) (discussing theories
of insider trading liability under Section 10(b) and the case law surrounding diem).
42 There are, of course, exceptions. The Supreme Court has not strictly adhered to
the idea that the defendant must already be in a fiduciary or fiduciarylike relationship in
order to state a violation. See Langevoort, A Post-Chiarella Restatement supra note 10, at 28
("Unlike the trading or tipping insider, the tippee bears no pre-existing fiduciary relation-
ship to the person with whom he trades. The Supreme Court's apparent endorsement of
some tippee liability is an indication that it will not adhere strictly to the idea that only
fiduciaries are obligated to make disclosures when trading."); see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 383-85 (describing corporate insiders' duty to purchasers of the corporation's
stock). Also, although the Supreme Court has yet to signify its agreement, recent case law
has created a small number of exceptions to the fiduciary duty requirement where the
deception element of Rule 1Ob-5 is otherwise satisfied. See e.g., SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d
42, 43 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that breach of fiduciary duty is not necessary in a Section
10(b) enforcement action for computer hacking); Thomas Lee Hazen, Jdentifying the Duty
Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material Nonpublic Information, 61 HAsiNos LJ. 881, 885-87
(2010) (discussing "outsider trading" cases where the fiduciary duty requirement has been
relaxed); Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Pincples, 94
IowA L REv. 1315, 1336-52 (2009) [hereinafter Nagy, Gradual Demise] (discussing the
"casting aside" of fiduciary duty principles); see also DoNALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRAD-
INo: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENTf & PREVENTION § 6:14, at 6-50 to -52 (2012) (summarizing
exceptions in the case law).
43 Under misappropriation theory, there is an additional element for establishing a
violation-that the defendant failed to disclose to the source the defendant's intention to
trade on the nonpublic information. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655. To be sure, pretrading
disclosure also precludes liability under the classical theory, but the fact of nondisclosure
under classical theory is redundant to the other elements. Under classical theory, pretrad-
ing disclosure to counterparties automatically negates the "breach of fiduciary duty" and
"nonpublic" elements of the cause of action. Under misappropriation theory, pretrading
disclosure to the source does not negate those other elements. Compare Richard W.
Painter, Kimberly D. Krawiec & Cynthia A. Williams, Don't As14 Just Tell Insider TradingAfter
United States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA. L REv. 153, 180 (1998) (arguing that disclosure of one's
plan to trade on material, nonpublic information might be enough to negate liability
under classical theory but suggesting that disclosure must include the content of nonpublic
information in order to do so), with Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading
Regime, 99 CoLuM. L. REv. 1491, 1491 (1999) (arguing that mere disclosure of one's plan to
trade on material, nonpublic information negates liability under the classical theory by
negating the deception element).
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been almost entirely judicially manufactured, albeit with considerable
congressional endorsement, if not ratification.
What follows is a simplified review of the elements of an insider
trading cause of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.4* The
first three elements pose no special hurdle if the defendant happens
to be a legislator. It is the fourth element that is controversial.
1. Trading on (or Tipping) Material Nonpublic Information
The first element-that the defendant "traded on the informa-
tion" in question-requires a showing that the defendant possessed
the material nonpublic information at the time he or she made the
securities trade. 4 6 Possession at the time of trading is often difficult to
establish, but, once proven, there is usually no further question that
the defendant traded in order to exploit the informational advantage
vis-A-vis other marketplace traders.4 7
In the typical case, the required mens rea for liability-scien-
ter 48-is not difficult to establish.49 To prove scienter, the complain-
ant must show that the "defendant knew that the information was
material and nonpublic or recklessly disregarded facts that would indi-
cate that the information in his possession was material and nonpub-
lic."50 For criminal prosecutions, which are brought by the
Department ofJustice, the defendant must have "willfully" committed
the offense.51 Courts have construed "willfully" to refer to violations
that occur with some "realization on the defendant's part that he was
44 Legislative histories of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 suggest that Congress had en-
dorsed (if not ratified) the multiple bases of liability pursued by the SEC and approved by
the courts. See Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984 and Its Effect on Existing Law, 37 VANo. L. Rev. 1273, 1274 (1984); Steve Thel, Statutory
Fndings and Insider Trading Regulation, 50 VANo. L. REv. 1091. 1118-21 (1997).
45 This Article does not cover two areas of regulation commonly associated with the
goal of deterring insider trading: section 16(b) (the "short swing" profits rule) and SEC
Rule 14e-3 of the Exchange Act (relating to tender offers).
46 See, e.g., SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1340 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Scienter necessarily
requires that the insider have possession of material nonpublic information at the time the
insider trades.").
47 LANGEvooer, supra note 42, § 3:13, at 3-32.
48 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976) (defining "scienter" as
"a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud").
49 LANGEVOORT, supra note 42, § 3:13, at 3-32. In 2000, in order to resolve confusion
in the case law about motivation and state of mind, the SEC adopted Rule lOb5-1, which
clarified that trading on material, nonpublic information was unlawful where the defen-
dant trades "on the basis of" material, nonpublic information, defined as trading "when
the person in question was aware of the material nonpublic information when the person
made the purchase or sale." Id. § 3:14, at 3-38 (quotations omitted). That said, some
courts have not deferred much to the Rule. Id. § 3:14, at 3-39.
50 Id. § 5:5, at 5-25.
51 Id. § 8:13, at 842 to -43.
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doing a wrongful act ... and that the knowingly wrongful act involved
a significant risk of effecting the violation that occurred."52
The defendant can, of course, argue that the trade in question
was made for reasons unrelated to the information in question. For
example, the defendant might insist that the trade would have hap-
pened regardless of the information because it was necessary to liqui-
date assets to pay upcoming bills. If the defendant makes such a
showing, courts may not find liability, especially in those jurisdictions
requiring that the defendant use (and not merely possess) the
information.ss
The prohibition covers not only trading but also the practice of
tipping, as well as trading on the tip, as detailed below. For the most
part, how this element gets resolved is substantively no different be-
cause the defendant happens to bear the title of Senator or
Representative.5 4
The second element-that the confidential information be "mate-
rial"-also presents no new legal issues. Information is deemed "ma-
terial" if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would consider it important in making an investment decision.55 In
effect, any information the disclosure of which would likely change an
issuer's securities prices will generally be regarded as material.
With respect to contingent or forward-looking information, mate-
riality is judged by "a balancing of both the indicated probability that
the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in
light of the totality of the company activity."56 Accordingly, if a legisla-
tor trades to profit from an anticipated legislative development, the
factfinder must assess the likelihood (at the time of the trade) that the
legislative event would come to pass and the importance of that event
to an issuer's business (at the time of the trade).
In theory, this would be a difficult task because most legislative
developments (such as the sudden passage of the STOCK Act bill in
2012) are tough to predict, given the dynamics and vicissitudes of law-
making. In practice, however, assessing "materiality" is often not so
arduous. The very fact of trading by the defendant may support a
finding of materiality. If the factfinder is persuaded that the defen-
dant traded in the hopes of profiting from the information in ques-
tion and that the defendant resembles a "reasonable investor," then
52 Id. § 8:13, at 8-43.
53 See id. § 3:13, at 3-34 to -35, for a discussion of those jurisdictions which adhere to
the "use" and not the "possession" standard.
54 That said, there may be some evidentiary difficulties that arise from the Speech or
Debate Clause. See infra Part IV.C.
5 See TSC Indus. v. Nortbway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
56 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)).
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the test of materiality is effectively satisfied.57 Finally, the defendant
will generally have a hard time convincing the factfinder that the in-
formation in question is not material in the face of the actual occur-
rence of the legislative event and its resulting impact on the issuer's
securities prices.58 If securities prices change dramatically following
the public release of the information in question, the element of ma-
teriality is presumptively satisfied.59
The third element-that the information in question must be
"nonpublic"-also poses no novel issues. Information is considered
nonpublic if it is not generally available to the investing public-that
is, it has not been broadly disseminated.co This element is rarely seri-
ously contested in insider trading cases. With respect to the securities
of an issuer with a large analyst following, once the information in
question gets into the hands of a large number of investors (or a
smaller number of institutional investors who direct a large volume of
trades), the security's market price will rapidly reflect the significance
of that information, thereby extinguishing the opportunity to profit
from insider trading. As a result, it is difficult to generate quick prof-
its by trading in such a security unless one holds information that the
general investing public does not know.61
To avoid any confusion, it is important to understand that the
requisite nonpublic information is not narrowly circumscribed to "in-
side information"-information that emanates directly from within
the corporation and specifically relates to the plans, operations, or
assets of the issuer whose securities are being traded.62 Nonpublic in-
formation also encompasses "market information," which emanates
from a source outside the issuer of the traded securities and tends to be
about the supply of and demand for the company's securities.6 3 Mar-
57 See LANGEvooRT, supra note 42, at § 5:2, 5-3 to -4.
58 Naturally, judges and juries will have a tough time concluding that an event was
improbable at the time of trading if they know that the event has in fact occurred. SeeMitu
Gulati,Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. REV.
773, 774 (2004) ("Even in the absence of any misconduct, a bad outcome alone might lead
people to believe that corporate managers committed securities fraud.").
59 Cf LANGEvoorr, supra note 42, § 5:2, at 511 to -12 ("If a major market movement
promptly follows the formal release to the public of the information in question, the mate-
riality test is presumptively satisfied.").
60 Id. at § 5:4, at 5-19.
61 Id.
62 See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Feral
Securities Laws, 93 Hanv. L. REv. 322, 329 (1979) (discussing how "corporate" and "market"
information both fall under the insider trading laws).
6s Id. (defining "market information" as concerning outside "transactions in a corpo-
ration's securities that will have an impact on their future price quite apart from expected
changes in the corporation's earnings or assets"). See Roberta S. Karmel, Book Review,
The Relationship Betumen Mandatory Disclosure and Prohibitions Against Insider Trading Why a
Pwpen" mghts Theory of Inside Information Is Untenable, 59 BRooK. L. REv. 149, 154 (1993), for
the distinction between "inside" and "market" information.
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ket information may be information that impacts the prices of the spe-
cfic security that is being traded (e.g., "information that an investment
adviser will shortly issue a 'buy' recommendation or that a large stock-
holder is seeking to unload his shares or that a tender offer will soon
be made for the company's stock").64 But market information may
also include more generalized information that impacts the share
prices of an entire industry or the stock market as a whole (e.g., Ben
Bernanke's prediction that the entire economy will tank).
Of course, legislators have access to both types of nonpublic in-
formation. Through legislators' subpoena power, they may gain ac-
cess to inside information during the course of a legislative
investigation into the matters of a particular publicly traded company.
Even more easily, they can gain access to market information in the
form of proposed legislation, anticipated criminal investigation, or an-
ticipated governmental action, all of which may impact the securities
prices of a single issuer or an entire industry.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that not all persons coming
into contact with material, nonpublic information are potentially lia-
ble. For example, if, during my morning jog, I happen to stumble
across some random trash containing a juicy stock tip and then pro-
ceeded to trade on the tip, I would not be liable for insider trading.
Why? It is because of the fourth element, which requires a breach of
fiduciary duty.es In my hypothetical, I have not violated any fiduciary
duty by trading on a random stock tip.6 6
So, what about legislators? Do they owe a fiduciary duty and, if
so, to whom?
2. In Breach of a Fiduciaty (or Fiduciary-Like) Duty
To decide whether a fiduciary duty exists and has been breached
requires us to distinguish between two accepted theories of insider
trading liability-classical and misappropriation.
64 United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 n.8 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); see SEC v. Seibald, No. 95 Civ. 2081(LLS), 1997 WL 605114,
at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1997) (denying defendants' motion for summary judgment in
an insider trading enforcement action concerning trades made based on an analyst's
report).
65 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (reversing defendant's Sec-
tion 10(b) conviction because no duty to disclose existed and noting that defendant was
not an "agent [of the target company in a proposed transaction], he was not a fiduciary, he
was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence").
66 If, however, the tip relates to an anticipated tender offer and I purchase shares in




Under the classical theory, affirmed in 1980 by the Supreme
Court in Chiarella v. United States,67 a person violates Rule 10b-5 and
Section 10(b) by trading on material, nonpublic information if that
person owes a fiduciary duty (of disclosure) to the counterparty of the
trade (later redefined by statute to extend to one or more contempo-
raneous traders in the marketplace).6* This fiduciary duty of disclo-
sure (articulated as a "fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain")6 9 does not
arise simply because the trader holds an informational advantage over
the counterparty. After all, the Chiarella Court noted that "Section
10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches
must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclo-
sure [as would be the case with insider trading], there can be no fraud
absent a duty to speak."70 Therefore, drawing from the common law
tort of misrepresentation, the Court maintained that a duty to disclose
material, nonpublic information prior to trading "arises when one
party has information 'that the other [party] is entitled to know be-
cause of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between
them.'"71
The Court did not elaborate on what constitutes a "similar rela-
tion of trust and confidence." However, courts have long used that
and similar phrases to describe relationships that were not strictly fi-
duciary as a matter of law but nonetheless shared some of the charac-
teristics of a fiduciary relationship (such as one party's reposing of
confidences in another)72 and thus warranted some of the protections
67 445 U.S. at 235.
68 By passing section 20A of the Exchange Act, Congress granted an express private
right of action to those investors trading contemporaneously with the insider trader. As a
result, contemporaneous traders who bought or sold stock in the opposite position of the
defendant trader may sue the insider trader for damages. Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2006). On Section 20A, see
LANGEVOORT, supra note 42, § 9.3, at 9-9.
69 The fiduciary duty of disclosure under classical theory has long been articulated as
a duty to "disclose or abstain"-either to disclose the material nonpublic information to
the investing public before trading or to abstain from trading while such nonpublic informa-
tion remains undisclosed. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir.
1968). But because most defendants do not have a right to disclose confidential informa-
tion, it is most often "the failure to abstain from trading, rather than the nondisclosure,
which is the basis for imposing liability." Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider TradingRegulation:
The Path Dependent Chwice Between Pmnperq Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REv. 1589,
1616 (1999) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Path Dependent Choice].
70 Chierella, 445 U.S. at 234-35.
71 Id. at 228 (emphasis added); see id at 230 (noting that silence in connection with
the sale of securities is only actionable as fraud if there is already a duty to disclose).
72 See, e.g., Vai v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 364 P.2d 247, 252 (Cal. 1961)
("The prerequisite of a confidential relationship is the reposing of trust and confidence by
one person in another who is cognizant of this fact.").
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generally applicable to fiduciary relationships.73 In an influential
opinion, United States v. Chestman,74 the Second Circuit held that a "re-
lationship of trust and confidence" must be the "functional equivalent
of a fiduciary relationship" and must "share the essential characteris-
tics of a fiduciary association."75 Because there is much overlap be-
tween fiduciary relationships and such other fiduciary-like
relationships, and the distinction is relevant mostly for allocating bur-
dens of proof,76 whenever I refer to "fiduciary duty," I mean to in-
clude analogous duties imposed due to a relation of trust and
confidence.
Who owes a fiduciary duty to contemporaneous traders in the
marketplace? The Chiarella Court suggested that those under a duty
to place shareholder welfare before their own are covered by this fidu-
ciary duty.77 As a consequence, the duty applies uncontroversially to
traditional corporate insiders (i.e., an issuer's officers, directors, and
controlling shareholders), as the Court specifically acknowledged.78
The duty also applies uncontroversially to employees and to the cor-
porate issuer itself." Hence, courts and commentators commonly as-
sumed that the classical theory espoused in Chiarella only concerned
the trading by corporate insiders.
However, the Court never stated that only corporate insiders
could be held liable.80 Indeed, the Chiarella Court approvingly cited
73 See Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and the
New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. L.. L. REv. 897, 906-07 (1993) (discussing the distinction
between "fiduciary" relationships and nonfiduciary but confidential ones).
74 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
75 Id. at 568.
76 See Scallen, supra note 73, at 907 ("[A] key distinction between confidential and
fiduciary relationships appears to center on whether a party seeking redress must prove
reliance on the other party.").
77 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) ("Application of a duty to
disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to
place the shareholder's welfare before their own, will not benefit personally through fraud-
ulent use of material, nonpublic information.").
78 Id. at 227 (noting that the duty "has been traditionally imposed on corporate 'insid-
ers,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders" (quoting In re Cady, Rob-
erts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961))).
79 Therefore, if a legislator happens to be moonlighting as a corporate insider, then
the duty would uncontroversially apply to him in his capacity as a corporate insider. Be-
cause many state legislative positions are part time, one would expect to find at least a few
such cases. With respect to members of Congress, however, such situations would be rare
because members of Congress are statutorily prohibited from "serv[ing] for compensation
as an officer or member of the board of any association, corporation, or other entity." 5
U.S.C. § 502 (2006); Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway, supra note 9, at 290.
80 See Chiarelks, 445 U.S. at 228 (stating only that there is "a relationship of trust and
confidence between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have ob-
tained confidential information by reason of their position with that corporation").
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Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States,"' an earlier Supreme Court
opinion which imposed Rule lOb-5 liability on defendants who were
not corporate insiders of the issuer of the traded securities. Moreo-
ver, as ChiefJustice Burger pointed out in his dissent in Chiarella, Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule lob-5 literally reach "any person" who engages "in
any fraudulent scheme" 2 in connection with a securities transaction.
Accordingly, no one-not even a member of Congress-is categori-
cally exempt from liability under these provisions.
In 1983, the Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC made two important
extensions. First, it announced that this fiduciary duty may apply to
certain confidential advisers of the issuer, such as underwriters, attor-
neys, accountants, or consultants, who are classified as "temporary" or
"constructive" insiders.83 "The basis for recognizing this fiduciary
duty," the Court clarified, "is not simply that such persons acquired
nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have entered
into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business
of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corpo-
rate purposes." 4 The Court further clarified that "[f]or such a duty
to be imposed .. . the corporation must expect the outsider to keep
the disclosed[,] nonpublic information confidential, and the relation-
ship at least must imply such a duty."8 5 Therefore, if a legislator hap-
pens to be advising a corporation in a manner that would imply a duty
to keep confidences, then the fiduciary duty to disclose (prior to trad-
ing) would uncontroversially apply to that legislator, who would be
regarded as a fiduciary vis-ft-vis the corporation's shareholders.
Second, Dirks extended insider trading liability to cover the prac-
tice of tipping and trading on the tip.8* But it did so by predicating
the tipper's and tippee's liability on the tipper's breach of the fiduci-
ary duty of loyalty, which includes the duty not to use entrusted infor-
mation for personal gain.87 Specifically, if the tipper breaches the
fiduciary duty of loyalty by passing on information to the tippee in
anticipation of a personal benefit (broadly defined)88 and the tippee
81 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (holding that two bank managers violated Rule 10b-5 for buy-
ing and re-selling stock in their individual capacities and based on the implicit undertaking
to act in the best interest of the selling shareholders). Affiliated Ute Citizens is cited in
Chiarella. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 229-30.
82 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240.
83 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
84 Id
85 Id.
86 Id. at 659.
87 Id. at 659-60.
88 The type of personal benefit that may satisfy the Dirks test includes pecuniary bene-
fit, reputational benefit, and the benefit that accrues to oneself when making a gift. See
LANGEVOORT, Stfa note 42. § 4:3, at 4-5 to -6.
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knows or has reason to know of the tipper's breach,89 then the tippee
inherits the duty owed by the tipper. As the Court explained, "[tihe
tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a par-
ticipant after the fact in the [tipper's] breach of a fiduciary duty.""
As a result, any subsequent trading by the tippee will subject both the
tippee and the tipper to liability.
To be clear, there is no liability for either the tipper or tippee
unless the tipper is already in a fiduciary relationship with the corpora-
tion's shareholders and thus owes the requisite fiduciary duty. Hence,
the tipper's duty uncontroversially applies to corporate insiders and
temporary insiders (as Dirks expressly contemplated). In addition, any
person to whom the insider improperly passes information inherits
that duty. Therefore, if a legislator knowingly receives an improper
tip from a corporate insider, then the legislator inherits the fiduciary
duty owed by the corporate insider. Consequently, the legislator may
not then trade on the tip or tip the information to someone else.
As in Chiarella, the Dirks Court did not foreclose the possibility of
classifying legislators as fiduciaries. It noted:
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be no duty to
disclose where the person who has traded on inside information
"was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not a fiduciary, [or] was
not a person in whom the sellers [of the securities] had placed their
trust and confidence."91
In this passage, the Court separately catalogues the corporation's
agent, fiduciary, and the person in whom trust and confidence had
been placed. This separately itemized list clarifies that "agents" and
"fiduciaries" are not redundant or coextensive categories under the
classical theory. Therefore, legislators, who are neither the corpora-
tion's nor its shareholders' agents, are not categorically excluded.
b. Misappripriation Theory
Under the alternative "misappropriation theory," which the Su-
preme Court endorsed in 1997 in United States v. O'Hagan,92 a person
may not trade on material, nonpublic information entrusted to that
person by the source of that information without disclosing to that
source the person's intention to trade on that information. 3 Drawing
on the common law of agency," the Court held that "a fiduciary's
89 Diks, 463 U.S. at 659-61.
90 Id. at 659 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980)).
91 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (alterations in original) (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222).
92 521 U.S. 642, 665 (1997).
A hL at 652.
94 See iL at 654-55 (referring to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENcy §§ 390, 395
(1958), on an "agent's disclosure obligation regarding use of confidential information").
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undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal's information to purchase
or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality,"
constitutes deception under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 because
such trading "defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that infor-
mation."95 Thus, liability under the misappropriation theory is pre-
mised on a preexisting fiduciary relationship between the trader and
the source "who entrusted him with access to confidential informa-
tion,"9 6 regardless of whether the source bought or sold securities or
was even a market participant at all.
In addition, lower courts have extended insider trading liability
to ban the practice of tipping and trading on the tip under the misap-
propriation theory, although the law is not entirely settled in this
area.9 7 Therefore, if a corporate lawyer improperly tips to a legislator
confidential client information that impacts the securities of the cli-
ent's competitor, then the legislator inherits the fiduciary duty owed
by the lawyer to his firm's client. As a result, the legislator may not
then trade (in the competitor's securities)98 on the tip or tip the infor-
mation to someone else.
Now that I have introduced both classical and misappropriation
theories, notice the critical difference between them as to whom the
requisite duty is owed. Under classical theory, the defendant (as
buyer or seller) owes the requisite fiduciary duty to the counterparty
to the trade (as seller or buyer). By contrast, under the misappropria-
tion theory, the defendant owes the requisite fiduciary duty to the
source-the person or entity who entrusted the defendant with access
to the confidential information.
There is also an important difference in the nature of the duty
implicated. Under Chiarella's classical theory, the relevant duty is the
duty to disclose,99 which courts have routinely and widely imposed on
all fiduciaries. By contrast, in both tipping 00 and misappropriation
95 Id. at 652.
96 Id. For the source to "entrust" a person with access to confidential information
does not strictly require that the source place the information in the fiduciary's hands or
even authorize access to the confidential information. LANGEVOORT, supra note 42, § 6:4,
at 6-13 n.1.
97 Courts have differed on whether all of the Dirs elements (relating to tipping and
trading on the tip) apply in the misappropriation context. Compare SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d
1263, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (insisting that standards for tipper-tippee liability are the same
under misappropriation theory as under classical theory), adth SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp.
1028, 1038 n.4 (1989) ("The misappropriation theory of liability does not require a show-
ing of a benefit to the tipper . . . .").
8 To be sure, the legislator is also proscribed from trading in the law firm's client's
securities, but that issue is easily handled by the classical theory (as extended by Dirks).
99 See supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
100 Bainbridge, Path Dependent Choice, supra note 69, at 1615 ("[T]he duty at issue in
tipping cases is not a duty to disclose, but rather a duty to refrain from self-dealing in
confidential information owed by the tipper to the source of the information.").
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theory cases, 01 the relevant obligation is the duty not to use entrusted
information for personal gain,o 2 the precise scope of which has va-
ried among different courts and different fiduciary contexts. 0
Also, I should clarify the positive law source of the requisite fidu-
ciary duty. Although there was once much debate and uncertainty
about this issue,1o4 it is now clear that the federal insider trading pro-
hibition, which may be "classified within the genus of federal conmon
law,"'05 has a federal source. 0 That said, as with other questions aris-
ing under the federal laws, state common law is relevant to and has
informed the task of identifying the requisite federal fiduciary duty
under federal insider trading law.'o
Finally, it is worth noting the implications of tying federal insider
trading law to the fiduciary principle. By choosing to condition liabil-
101 SeeNagy, Gradual Demise, supra note 42, at 1360-61 ("O'Hagan, however, made clear
that it is the insider trader's undisclosed breach of trust and loyalty-and not merely his
breach of confidentiality-that constitutes the fraud under Rule 10b-5.").
102 This duty has different articulations and can be found in the penumbrae of other
explicit duties. See REsrATEMENT (TDn) OF AGENCY § 8.01, 8.02 & cmts. c, d, 8.04, 8.05
(2006); RESTATEMENT (TERD) OF TRusrs § 5 cmt. a, illus. g (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OFTHE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERs § 60(2) & cmt.j (1998); Am. LAw INsTrE, PIuNCIPLES OF
CORORATE GovERNANCE: ANADsS AND RECOMMENDATIONs § 5.04 (1992); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) or AGENCY §§ 387, 388 & cmt. c, 393, 395 (1958); 1 FLOYD R. MECHEM, LAw oF
AGENCY §§ 1189, 1191, 1209, 1224 (2d ed. 1914).
103 See e.g., Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 188-96 (7th Cir. 1978) (discussing the
jurisdictions' differing holdings before ultimately holding that there is no recovery unless
the corporation can show injury from insider trading); Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739,
741-46 (Fla. 1975) (same); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969) (stat-
ing that a corporate fiduciary entrusted with valuable information may not appropriate
that information for the fiduciary's own use even when doing so causes no injury to the
corporation); Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 7-8 (Del. Ch. 1948) (noting that loss to
the employer need not be alleged where the employee breached fiduciary duty for trading
on confidential information about employer corporation).
104 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the
Federal Insider Trading Pakibition, 52 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1189, 1192 (1995); Theresa A.
Gabaldon, State Answers to Federal Questions: The Common Law of Federal Securities Regulation,
20 . CoRP. L. 155, 212-13 (1994).
105 STEPHEN M. BAINBUDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND EcoNoMIcs 556 (2002).
106 Cf Iman Anabtawi, Secrt Compensation, 82 N.C. L. REv. 835,863-64 (2004) (observ-
ing that the Supreme Court suggested a federal fiduciary law source underlying the federal
insider trading prohibition).
107 See BAINtuDGE, supra note 105, at 556 (reviewing cases in which courts relied upon
state law to resolve questions arising under federal securities laws and concluding that "the
question is not whether state law is relevant to the task of defining insider trading, but
rather the extent to which it should be incorporated into the federal prohibition").
For insider trading cases where federal courts expressly consulted state law on the fiduciary
issue, see, for example, SEC v. Talbot, 530 F.3d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 2008) (looking to
Delaware state law to support the proposition that a director owes a fiduciary duty to the
director's corporation); SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 76 (1st Cir. 2000) (looking to Massa-
chusetts state law to support the proposition that sole shareholders of a closely held corpo-
ration owe fiduciary duties to each other); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 571




ity on the breach of fiduciary duty, the Chiarella Court selected "an
evolving, dynamic concept which [by its nature] ... cannot be rigidly
categorized."108 In 1982, Donald Langevoort presciently observed:
"[W] ithin the broad outlines of the [Chiarella] Court's rationale, there
is room for creative interpretation, permitting the law to continue to
develop in accord with perceptions about fairness in the securities
marketplace. The flexibility of the fiduciary principle should not be
underestimated."'" With these clarifications, the fundamental ques-
tion becomes: is a legislator in a fiduciary relationship to either the
counterparties of the trade (as under classical theory) or to the per-
son who entrusted the nonpublic information to him (as under the
misappropriation theory)? To make this case, we must first under-
stand how courts have determined who is a fiduciary.
B. The Modus Operandi of Courts
Whether a particular defendant falls into the category "fiduciary"
will often be an easy question, given clear precedent on point. For
example, under the classical theory, courts regard officers, directors,
controlling shareholders, employees, and the corporation itself as fi-
duciaries vis-A-vis shareholders based on well-established prece-
dents."t0 Under the misappropriation theory, courts treat defendants
involved in "hornbook fiduciary relations,""' such as employer-em-
ployee, principal-agent, or client-attorney, as fiduciaries. But what
about harder, novel cases?
Recall that in Chiarella, the Court predicated insider trading lia-
bility under the classical theory on the finding of a duty to disclose,
which arises out of a "fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and
confidence" between the parties to a transaction.11 2 While the phrase
"trust and confidence" signaled the Court's intention to recognize a
broader class of relationships than strictly fiduciary ones, it regrettably
told us little more.
Three years later, in Dirks, the Supreme Court extended the fidu-
ciary category to cover certain recipients of confidential information
as temporary insiders. But the Court did so not by identifying key
attributes of fiduciaries generally. Instead, it emphasized that there
must be an implicit understanding on the part of the issuer of the
traded securities that the recipient of the information will use that
108 See Scallen, supra note 73, at 902.
109 Langevoort, A Post-Chiarella Restatement, supra note 10, at 53.
110 See, e.g, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-30 (1980) (summarizing
precedents).
112 Chestmka 947 F.2d at 568.
112 Chiarela, 445 U.S. at 228.
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information solely for the issuer's benefit and will keep it
confidential.is
Finally, fourteen years later, in O'Hagan, the Supreme Court em-
braced the misappropriation theory but did so without any further
elaboration of how to identify the existence of a fiduciary relation-
ship." 4  Although it "referenced the term 'fiduciary' seventeen
times,"115 it did little more than point out that the misappropriation
theory "is limited to those who breach a recognized duty."116
Given minimal guidance from the Supreme Court, lower federal
courts have produced decisions that run the gamut. Some courts have
examined the "reasonable and legitimate" expectations of the parties
and have inquired as to whether those parties had "a history or prac-
tice of sharing business confidences, and [whether] those confidences
generally were maintained."' 17 Some courts have recognized a rela-
tionship of trust and confidence where the trader has "expressly
agreed" to keep the information in question confidential;'" others
have concluded that such an agreement of confidentiality, standing
alone, is not enough."x9
Some courts have highlighted factors emphasizing imbalance in
the relationship, such as "dominance" and "superior influence," 20 or
113 See supra text accompanying notes 84-85. Subsequent lower courts interpreting
Dirks have clarified that the rcipient must have expressly or impliedly assented to such
duties. e, e.g., SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1050-51 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that
mere receipt of nonpublic information is not enough to establish insider trading liability if
the recipient is not in a fiduciary relationship), rev'd and remanded, 530 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir.
2008); SEC v. Ingram, 694 F. Supp. 1437, 1440 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (interpreting Dirks as
requiring that the recipient "must have expressly or impliedly entered into a fiduciary rela-
tionship with the issuer"). But see SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 (C.D. Cal. 1983)
(suggesting-more liberally-that a fiduciary relationship vis-4-vis the issuer's shareholders
is created when the recipient of confidential information "knew or should have known that
the information he received was confidential and that it had been disclosed to him solely
for legitimate corporate purposes").
114 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650, 652 (1997).
115 Nagy, Gradual Demise, spm note 42, at 1332.
116 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 666.
117 SEC. v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2003).
118 See, e.g., SEC v. Nothern, 598 F. Supp. 2d 167, 175 (D. Mass. 2009); SEC v. Lyon,
529 F. Supp. 2d, 444, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); SEC v. Kirch, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1147 (N.D.
IlL. 2003).
119 See, eg., SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 725 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (stating that "an
express or implied promise merely to keep information confidential" is not enough to
create a relationship of trust and confidence; rather, the agreement should also "impose
on the party who receives the information the legal duty to refrain from trading on or
otherwise using the information for personal gain"), vacated and remanded, 620 F.3d 551
(5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
120 Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1011 (citing United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568
(2d Cir. 1991)) (rejecting the finding of a fiduciary-like relationship for relationships
among equals); see United States v. Cassese, 273 F. Supp. 2d 481, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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"de facto control and dominance."1 21 Still others have focused more
broadly on the granting of some form of "discretionary authority" and
a resulting "dependency" or reliance, 22 and so on. With such vague-
ness and variance in working definitions, it should not be surprising to
find that federal courts have recognized a strikingly diverse array of
persons as fiduciaries, including an electrician who traded on infor-
mation overheard on the job, 23 a member of a business round table
who traded on information learned from a fellow member,124 and a
government affairs consultant who tipped information learned from a
Treasury Department briefing.125 In sum, in deciding whether to im-
pose a fiduciary duty for purposes of federal insider trading law, fed-
eral courts tend to invoke an ad hoc list of imprecise factors with no
clear weightings and no clear explanation as to why the posited factors
are relevant.
This approach is largely consistent with how state courts have for
centuries determined new fiduciaries. Instead of deploying a widely
accepted, precise, and rule-like definition, state courts also invoke an
ad hoc list of vague factors. Not surprisingly, the universe of fiducia-
ries has gradually expanded to include such strange bedfellows as
marriage brokerage agencies, 26 commercial developers of inven-
tions,1 27 psychiatrists,' 2 8 life tenants of property,12o and private hospi-
tals.'" As a consequence, experts have described fiduciary law as
121 Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568 (quoting United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 125
(2d Cir. 1982)).
122 See, e.g., SEC v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d 508,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Chestman, 947
F. 2d at 569); United States v. Victor Teicher& Co., L.P., 785 F. Supp. 1137, 1148 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (citing Chestman, 947 F. 2d at 567).
123 Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 513.
124 SEC v. Kirch, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1147 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
125 SEC v. Nothern, 598 F. Supp. 2d 167, 170 (D. Mass. 2009).
126 Fox v. Encounters Int'l, No. 05-1139, No 05-1404, 2006 WL 952317, at *5-6 (4th
Cir. Apr. 13, 2006) (upholding a jury finding that a marriage brokerage agency who rec-
ommended a physically abusive husband was a fiduciary of the woman).
127 Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573 F.3d 976,983-84 (7th Cir. 1978) (recognizing
sufficient evidence of a confidential relationship between the commercial developer/em-
ployer and the inventor/employee); Stevens v. Marco, 305 P.2d 669, 678-79 (Cal Dist. Ct.
App. 1956) (recognizing a fiduciary relationship between the inventor and commercial
developer of the invention). But see City of Hope Nat. Med. Ctr. v. Genentech, Inc., 181
P.3d 142, 150 (Cal. 2008) (finding no fiduciary relationship between a medical research
center and a biotechnology company despite the parties having entered a contract); Wolf
v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 860, 865 (Cal. Ct. App, 2003) (finding no fiduciary
relationship between a movie studio and a novelist despite the parties having entered a
contract).
128 MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D. 2d 482,482 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (holding psychia-
trists to be fiduciaries in regards to confidential information).
1 Leonard S. Sealy, Fiduciay Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 77-78 (1962).
1Io Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817, 823 (N.J. 1963) (holding that a hospi-
tal's power to exclude a physician from user-privileges was to "be viewed judicially as a
fiduciary power to be exercised in reasonable and lawful manner for the advancement of
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"amorphous,"13 "intrinsically non-rational,"132 "ill-defined," 3 3
"messy,"'3 "atomistic,"'a "slippery,"136 "protean,"137 "confused," 38
"problematic," 39 "result-oriented,"o40 and "elusive."x4
In highlighting the indeterminacy of the judicial task of identify-
ing fiduciaries, I am not suggesting that courts are reaching conclu-
sions without reasoning. In fact, courts often rely on forms of
analogical reasoning and compare-either implicitly'42 or explicitly-
the defendant's situation to instances where fiduciary status is well es-
tablished. For example, when courts originally encountered members
of a corporation's board of directors, they explicitly analogized the
directors to private trustees, 43 agents,'44 or partners's-familiar in-
stances of fiduciaries. Of course, over time, courts came to regard
directors themselves as uncontroversial fiduciaries. 46 As fiduciary law
the interests of the medical profession and the public generally" (quoting Falcone v. Mid-
dlesex Cnty. Med. Serv., 170 A.2d 791, 799 (N.J. 1961))).
131 Scallen, supra note 73, at 902.
132 J. C. SHEPHERD, THE LAw oF FIDucIAREs 3 (1981)
s33 P. D. FINN, FIDUctRY OauGATIoNs 1 (1977).
134 D. Gordon Smith, The Cntical Resource Theory of Fiduciay Duty, 55 VAND. L REV.
1399, 1400 (2002).
135 Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis ofFiduciary Obligation, 1988 DuKE
L.J 879, 915 [hereinafter DeMott, Beyond Metaphor].
136 PeterJ. Hammer, Pegram v. Herdrich: On Peritonitis Preemption, and the Elusive Goal
of Managed Care Accountability, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 767, 771 n.6 (2001).
13 LEONARD . RomAN, FmucanAy LAw 2 (2005).
18 Leonard I Rotman, Fiducieay Laws "Holy Grail": Reconciling Theory and Practice in
Fiduciary Jurisprudence, 91 B.U. L. REv. 921, 922 (2011).
139 Id.
140 Id. at 924.
141 DeMott, Beyond Metaphor, supra note 135, at 879.
142 Courts implicitly invoke analogies when referring to an ad hoc list of factors or at-
tributes deemed to be relevant for determining whether the defendant is a fiduciary.
143 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 179, 193 (1991) (noting that 'in older cases, the position of a
corporate insider has been analogized to that of a trustee" and citing cases); see also Farwell
v. Pyle-Nat'l Electric Headlight Co., 124 N.E. 449, 452 (Ill. 1919) (holding that the director
was not entitled to retain profits from a self-dealing transaction because directors "occupy
the position of trustees for the collective body of stockholders"); People ex rel Manice v.
Powell, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y. 1911) ('The relation of the directors to the stockholders is
essentially that of trustee and cestui que trust.').
144 See Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cuninghame, [1906] 2 A. 34
(Ch.) at 42-43 (discussing how directors are agents for certain purposes).
145 See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (noting that stockholders
and directors in a close corporation owe each other a duty of loyalty as rigorous as that of
partners).
146 See e.g. Boyer v. Wilmington Materials. Inc., 754 A.2d 881, 907 (Del. Ch. 1999)
("[D]irectors of corporations organized under Delaware law owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporations upon whose boards they serve and to the stockholders of those corporations."
(quoting 1 DAVID A. DRExLER ET AL., DELAWARE CoRPoRATIoN IAw AND PRACTICE § 15.02
(1997) (alteration in original))); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) ("Corpo-
rate officers and directors ... stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stock-
holders."); Schafthauser v. Arnholt & Schaefer Brewing Co., 67 A. 417, 417 (Pa. 1907)
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scholars have observed, analogies have played an especially crucial
role in the development of fiduciary law.' 47 Indeed, the most cited
case in fiduciary law, Meinhard v. Salmon, involved an explicit analogy
to partners.xas As Deborah DeMott has noted, the "pervasiveness and
persistence" of the use of analogies in the fiduciary context "suggest
that it is an inevitable aspect of fiduciary analysis." 49
So, if ajudge is presented with the question, "Are legislators fidu-





The question of whether a legislator is a "fiduciary" always em-
beds an ancillary question: fiduciary to whom? Consider the following
potential beneficiaries: citizens, the legislature (and fellow legisla-
tors), and the government that the legislator serves.'50 Depending on
the beneficiary, a particular theory of liability applies. For example,
suppose that the beneficiaries are the citizens whom the legislator rep-
resents but with whom the legislator has no personal contact. As a
general matter, it is unlikely that legislators are receiving juicy stock
tips from ordinary citizens. However, when legislators trade on mate-
rial, nonpublic information, some of those trading counterparties will
be citizens. This suggests that for citizens, the classical theory of liabil-
ity is relevant. One can then analogize the legislator-citizen relation-
ship to more established fiduciary relationships, for example, the
relationship between a trustee and beneficiaries of the trust. The fol-
lowing schematic summarizes the potential fiduciary relationships and
potential analogies that judges could employ:
("[T]here can be no doubt [that the director] does occupy such a fiduciary rela-
tion ... that he shall manage the business of the company in such a manner as to pro-
mote ... the common interests of all the shareholders.").
147 See EvanJ. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations ofAdministrative Law, 54 UCIA L REV. 117,
125 (2006) ("Courts have eschewed formalistic criteria for identifying fiduciary relations
and instead reason by analogy to paradigmatic relations . . . ."); DeMott, Beyond Metaphor,
supra note 135, at 879, 891 ("The evolution of the law of fiduciary obligation illustrates,
perhaps more powerfully than most bodies of law, the power of analogy in legal argumen-
tation."); Tamar Frankel, Fiducimy Law, 71 CAuF. L REv. 795, 804 (1983) (discussing
courts' practice of analogizing new fiduciary relations to existing prototypes); Scallen,
supra note 73, at 905 ("[T]he use of analogy is the means by which most innovations in
fiduciary law 'traditionally' have been created.").
148 Meinhard 164 N.E. at 546 ("Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one an-
other ... the duty of the finest loyalty.").
149 DeMott, Beyond Metaphor, supra note 135, at 891.
150 Notice that the STOCK Act explicitly states that members of Congress owe a fiduci-
ary duty "to the Congress, the United States Government, and the citizens of the United
States." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(g)(1) (2011).
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TABLE 1: POTENTIAL FIDucIARY RELATIONSHIPS
871
# BENEFICIARY THEORY OF LIABILITY ANALOGY
private trustee;
I citizens classical director
(to shareholders)
2 legislature, misappropriation partner
2 fellow legislators misappropriation partner
director
3 government misappropriation (to corporation)
B. Fiduciary to Citizens
Are legislators fiduciaries to citizens under classical theory? If so,
then a legislator who trades on material, nonpublic information may
be breaching a duty to disclose to those "citizen-investors" on the
other side of the trade.15 Alternatively, under Dirks, a legislator who
151 Some counterparties will be citizens of the nation (for members of Congress) or
domiciled in a particular state (for that state's legislators). Of course, not every
counterparty will have a special relationship to the legislator. For example, the
counterparties of federal legislators could be foreign investors to whom no fiduciary duty is
owed or the counterparties of state legislators could be investors domiciled in other states.
However, at least some counterparties will be fellow citizens of the legislator. The notion
that government officials are fiduciaries to citizens in the context of insider trading has
been suggested by other scholars. See LANEvooR, supa" note 42, § 3:9, 3-20 to -22; Krim-
mel, supm note 10, at 1503-04; Nagy, Congressional Officials, supra note 10, at 1140-47.
Nagy proposes two theories by which members of Congress could be deemed fiducia-
ries under classical theory: constructive insiders and public fiduciaries to "citizen-inves-
tors." In my view, the first theory is limited and unpersuasive, which Nagy partially
concedes. Recall that in Disd, the Supreme Court extended who counts as a fiduciary be-
yond traditional insiders to "constructive insiders," such as lawyers, accountants, or under-
writers. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983). Pointing to legislative history of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Nagy suggests that Congress happily acknowledged
the Dirk extension and listed "government officials" as a potential category that could be
pursued, in addition to the "underwriter, accountant, lawyer or consultant." Nagy, Congres-
sional Officials, supra note 10, at 1140. Nagy concludes that adding members of Congress to
this list "fits well within the classical framework" and that it would "be quite reasonable to
impute a disclosure obligation" to members of Congress. Id.
This "constructive insider" theory suffers from two weaknesses. First, as Nagy acknowl-
edges, id at 1142, this theory cannot apply to various instances of legislator insider trading.
For example, if a member of Congress trades based on his nonpublic knowledge of immi-
nent tax code changes, it would be folly to suggest that somehow that member has become
a constructive insider of all those firms whose stock price is thereby affected. Second-and
this is a point not made by Nagy-all the temporary or constructive insiders identified in
Diks were in clear principal-agent relationships, often of a textbook nature: hired lawyers,
investment bankers, and accountants. Put another way, these constructive insiders were
paid to give advice to the issuer. One cannot suggest that legislators are literally hired in
this manner or figuratively stand in some similar consulting relationship. Regardless of
how generously one weights verbiage in Committee Reports, a casual insertion of the term
"government officials" cannot counter this fundamental difference. For these reasons, leg-
islators cannot be considered to be constructive insiders on the authority of Dists.
By contrast, Nagy's second theory regarding "citizen-investors" holds promise, al-
though my defense is based on different grounds.
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tips such information to friends or relatives may be breaching the duty
not to use information entrusted to that legislator to benefit citizens
for personal gain.'52
1. Analogy: Private Trustee
We can analogize the relationship between the legislator and citi-
zens to the relationship between the trustee and beneficiaries of a pri-
vate trust.s53 In the prototypical Anglo-American trust, the settlor
contracts with the trustee to manage a portfolio of assets in the best
interests of the beneficiaries, subject to ex ante conditions imposed by
the settlor in the deed of trust.'5 Accordingly, three important fea-
tures of a trust are (1) its creation through a manifestation of consent
by the settlor, 5x5 (2) the delegation of broad managerial authority to
the trustee over entrusted property, 5 6 and (3) the imposition of limi-
tations on the trustee's authority through the instrument that created
the trust.5 7
We see analogous features in the context of the legislator-citizen
relationship. First, just as the trustee-beneficiary relationship is estab-
lished through an act of consent, the legislator-citizen relationship
arises from an act of consent by the electorate. Conventional demo-
cratic theory posits that the legitimacy of our republic is based on the
consent of the governed. 58 Of course, as Ethan Leib and his col-
leagues have argued, the "citizenry of even the most liberal and demo-
cratic of states rarely consent meaningfully to the state's authority.
Simply casting a ballot-or not voting-with-one's-feet-through-emigra-
tion-is hardly a conferral of consent to those individuals or institu-
tions ruling over citizens' daily lives."** While consent in the
electoral context may not be as robust as a settlor's consent in the
private trust context, both sets of relationships (legislator-citizen and
trustee-beneficiary) can nonetheless be characterized as involving a
152 Nagy, Congressional Oficials supra note 10, at 1147.
153 Cf Deborah A. DeMott, Agency by Analogy: A Comment on Odious Debt, 70 L. & CoN
TrE. PRoBs. 157, 166-67 (2007) (comparing government officers to private trustees in the
odious debt context).
154 See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) Or TRusrs § 2 (2003); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs
Theory of Trust Loa, 89 CoRNELm L REv. 621, 624 (2004); Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei,
The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative LAgal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434,
438 (1998).
155 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF TRusTs § 13 (2003) ("A trust is created only if the settlor
properly manifests an intention to create a trust relationship.").
156 Id. § 2.
157 Cf id. (defining a trust as arising from the parties' intentions with respect to certain
property).
158 See Leib et al., Fiduciary Theory ofJudging, supra note 15, at 14.
159 1&
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voluntary expression of willingness by a person or group of persons to
entrust responsibility to another person.xoo
Second, just as the private trustee is delegated broad authority to
manage the trust assets to benefit the beneficiaries, legislators have
been delegated broad legislative authority over the assets of their gov-
ernment, including the public fisc, to benefit citizens. At the federal
level, this delegation is signified by the first provision of the Constitu-
tion, Article I, Section 1, which established the U.S. Congress and re-
fers to the "legislative Powers herein granted."' 6'
Third, just as the deed of trust defines the constraints of a trus-
tee's authority, the federal or state constitutions define the constraints
of legislative authority, either directly through express substantive pro-
visions or indirectly by setting up procedures and institutions empow-
ered to establish them. Of course, these constraints on the fiduciary
are not all encompassing. Although the purpose of the deed of trust
is to protect the interests of the beneficiaries in accordance with the
settlor's intention, the beneficiaries actually remain quite vulnerable
to a trustee's predation. Unlike in principal-agent relationships where
the principal can ordinarily intervene freely and dismiss agents at will,
the trust beneficiaries ordinarily must request judicial intervention in
order to dismiss a trustee for malfeasance.162 Similarly, citizens have
limited means of redress against legislators and exercise no meaning-
ful control over them.
If this analogy to the trustee strikes one as odd, consider that a
growing body of scholarship recognizes not only that the Framers in-
tended to impose fiduciary standards on government officials,'63 in-
160 In the alternative, one could refer to the theory of popular sovereignty to argue
that the consent of "the people" of the thirteen revolutionary states, as expressed through
popular ratification in accordance with Article VII of the Constitution, constitutes the rele-
vant consent on which the federal legislator-citizen relationship rests. For discussions of
the relationship between popular sovereignty and the legitimacy of our republic, see, for
example, LARy D. KRAMER, THE PEoPLE THEMsELvEs: PoPuLAR CONslTUTIONALISM AND
JuOaLe REviEw 5 (2004); Christian G. Fritz, Alternative Visions ofAmerican Constitutionalism:
Popular Sovereignty and the Erly American Constitutional Debate 24 HAsINcs CoNsT. LQ. 287,
306-08 (1997); James A. Gardner, Consent, Lgtimacy and Elections: Implanenting Popular
Sovereignty Under the Lckean Constitution, 52 U . Prrr. L. REv. 189, 192 (1990); Sung Hui
Kim, "We the (Supermajority of) the People": The Development of a Rationale for Written Higher Law
in North American Constitutions, 137 PRoc. Am. PmL. Socv 364, 388-89 (1993).
161 U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 1.
162 Leib et. al, iduciasy Theory ofJudging, supra note 15, at 9.
163 See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General
Wefare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founder, 11 TEx. REv. L. & Pot. 239, 244 (2007)
("[Tihe 'general Welfare' limitation [in the Taxing and Spending Clause] was one of a
number of provisions inserted to impose fiduciary-style rules on the new federal govern-
ment.. . ."); Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 243, 248 (2004) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause was
intended to incorporate "the limitations of fiduciary duty"); Robert G. Natelson, The Consti-
tution and the Public Trust, 52 Bure. L. REv. 1077, 1087 (2004) [hereinafter Natelson, The
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cluding legislators,164 but also that the fiduciary concept most
commonly invoked during the revolutionary era was trusteeship and
"public trust."1es For example, the Federalist Papers repeatedly char-
acterizes public officials, including legislators, as trustees, 6 and the
U.S. Constitution refers to "public Trust" 6 7 and describes public of-
fices as being of "Trust."168 In invoking the analogy to the trustee, the
Framers were merely continuing a tradition dating back to Cicero,
who famously opined that "[t]he guardianship of the state is a kind of
trusteeship." 69 Most of the English colonies were expressly founded
on the basis of trust-that the King had granted a charter for the ben-
efit of the settlers residing in the colonies.o7 0
Moreover, these references to public trust were not just empty
metaphor. Recent legal-historical work supports the view that the
Framers intended even noncriminal breaches of trust by public offi-
Constitution and the Public Trust] ("[I]t really was the 'general purpose' of the founders to
impose fiduciary standards on the federal government."); Robert G. Natelson, The General
Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. RErv. 1,
50 (2003) ("Public officials were seen as the people's agents and trustees, and bound by
something akin to private trust standards."); E. Mabry Rogers & Stephen B. Young, Public
Office as a Public Trust: A Suggestion that Impeachment for High Crimes and Misdemeanors Implies
a Fiduciary Standard, 63 GEo. L.J. 1025, 1026 (1975).
An impressive and growing body of scholarship calls for imposing fiduciary standards
on government. See, e.g., EvaN Fox-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY'S PROMISE: THE STATE AS Fiouci
ARY 4 (2011) (the state itself as a fiduciary); Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in
Covernment Yet?: An Answer from Fiduciary Theoy, 1996 U. It.. L. REv. 57, 63 (1996) (con-
gressmen need stricter fiduciary duties); EvanJ. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking
Popular Representation in Agenry Rulemaking, 88 TEx. L. REv. 441, 448 (2010) (administrative
agencies as fiduciaries); Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31
QuEN's L.J. 259, 260-61 (2005) (same as Fox-DEcENT, supra); Ethan J. Leib & David L.
Ponet, Fiduciary Repreentation and Deliberative Engagement with Children, 20 J. PouT. PHIL.
178, 179 (2012) [hereinafter, Leib & Ponet, Fiduciary Representation] (discussing recent
work on government actors as fiduciaries); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126
HARv. L. REv. 671, 677 (2013) ("political representatives" as fiduciaries).
164 See Leib et al., Fiduciary Theory offudging, supra note 15, at 17 (observing that John
Locke, "whose writings heavily influenced the U.S. founders," viewed legislators as fiduciary
trustees); supra note 163.
165 Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, supra note 163, at 1086-87.
166 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("The federal and state governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of
the people . . . ."); id. at 316 ("The nature of [legislators'] public trust implies a personal
influence among the people, and that they are more immediately the confidential guardi-
ans of the rights and liberties of the people."); id. at 344 ("solemn trust"); id, at 350
(describing elected officials as holding the people's "public trust"); THE FEDERAIusr No.
59, at 366 (Alexander Hamilton) ("guardianship" and "trust"); id. at 396 (describing im-
peachable offenses as "those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men,
or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust").
167 U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 3.
18 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 3, ci. 7; id. art I, § 9, cl. 8; id, art. II, § 1, c. 2.
169 MAacus Ttuus CIERo, ON MoRAL OBLIGATION 69 (John Higginbotham trans.,
University of California Press 1967).
170 See Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, supra note 163, at 1134-36.
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cials to be remediable by impeachment and removal. 7 1 Also, the tra-
dition of analogizing public officials to trustees continues on in
modem judicial opinions. For example, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated in a case affirming the conviction of a public official
under the federal mail fraud statute: "[A] public official acts as 'trus-
tee for the citizens and the State ... and thus owes the normal fiduci-
ary duties of a trustee, e.g., honesty and loyalty' to the citizens and the
State." 7 2 Even the Senate's Standing Orders employ the trustee anal-
ogy to define senators' duties:
The ideal concept of public office, expressed by the words, 'A pub-
lic office is a public trust', signifies that the officer has been en-
trusted with public power by the people; that the officer holds this
power in trust to be used only for their benefit and never for the
benefit of himself or of a few . . . .173
In short, in deciding whether legislators are fiduciaries, judges
can find a plausible analogy to the private trust. Just as trustees owe
fiduciary duties to beneficiaries, legislators owe fiduciary duties to citi-
zens, some of whom will be counterparties to their trades.
2. Analogy: Director (to Shareholders)
Besides the analogy to the private trust, might there be an anal-
ogy to the corporation? It is axiomatic that directors of a corporation
are fiduciaries of its shareholders under federal insider trading law,'74
even though directors are neither trustees' 75 nor agents of the corpo-
ration or its shareholders. 76 Might we analogize the legislator to a
director and the citizens whom the legislator represents to the corpo-
ration's shareholders?'" For purposes of this analogy, I focus on par-
adigmatic public corporations held by numerous and dispersed
shareholders.
171 See id. at 1170-71; Leib et. al, Fiduciaty Theoy ofJudging, supra note 15, at 17-18.
172 United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1294 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting in part United
States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1363 (4th Cir. 1979)), reol, McNally v. United States,
superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006); see infra Part IL.B.S.
173 Standing Orders of the Senate Manual, 87 S. Doc. 107-1, at 118-19 (2002).
17 See, e.g., SEC v. Blackwell, 291 F. Supp. 2d 673, 687 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (noting that a
director may be liable for insider trading violations for breaching the fiduciary duty to the
corporation and its shareholders); SEC v. Lenfest, 949 F. Supp. 341, 345 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(noting that a director has a fiduciary duty to shareholders).
175 See RESTATEMENT (TUiRD) OF TItUSTs § 5(g) cmt. g (2003) ("Corporate... directors
. do not hold tide to the property of the corporation and therefore are not
trustees. . . .").
176 See RESrATEMENT (TsnRD) oF Aoeric § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (2006) ("[Corporate] direc-
tors are neither the shareholders' nor the corporation's agents. . . .").
177 Cf LANoEvooRT, supra note 42, § 6:6, at 6-21 n.5 ("An intriguing question is
whether elected officials can properly be treated as fiduciaries. Certainly, they are not
employees; there is no identifiable principal to whom they are responsible.... In this
sense, the analogy to a corporation's board of directors is apt.").
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An important feature of a widely held public corporation is the
separation of ownership from control. 7 8 Shareholders are tradition-
ally regarded as owners of the corporation, and they do possess a
residual claim on the corporation's assets and earnings. 79 But, unlike
other common forms of ownership, shareholders do not exercise any
meaningful control over how corporate assets are managed. The law
in most states severely restricts shareholder power and accords broad
discretion over corporate affairs to a collective decision-making body
of specialists-the board of directors, which either alone or through
its delegatees makes the vast majority of corporate decisions.180 While
directors are charged with exercising their authority in the best inter-
ests of shareholders,1si shareholders have limited means of holding
directors accountable. Shareholders ordinarily cannot compel direc-
tors to undertake corporate actions or even to terminate un-
derperforming directors. They can cast a ballot at director elections,
but in most cases this will be ineffective. Shareholders have no direct
access to corporate information, relying almost entirely on mandatory
disclosures filed with the SEC. Shareholders are diffuse, dispersed,
and face collective action problems in monitoring director actions. As
a result, many shareholders are rationally ignorant about corporate
affairs. 8 2
Our government also features separation of ownership from con-
trol. As Richard Painter has observed, "[a] republican form of govern-
178 See ADous A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PRoPERTY 5-6 (1933). For an illuminating examination of Berle and Means's con-
tribution, see generally William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Cgnturys
Turn, 26 J. CoRn. L. 737, 754-56 (2001) (noting that Berle and Means were influential in
that they "hit the issue" of separation in entrepreneurial functioning).
179 SeeWilliam W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against SharehokierEmpower-
ment, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 653, 662-65 (2010) (discussing the shareholders' traditional role
and critiques of that role).
180 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 141(a) (2011) (stating that the corporation's busi-
ness and affairs are "managed by or under the direction of a board of directors"). As the
leading state of incorporation for large corporations, Delaware's law on this issue is the
most important.
181 I do not revisit the age-old debate over the proper purpose of the corporation
because resolution of that debate is not critical to the purposes of this Article. For simplic-
itv, this Article assumes the conventional, shareholdervalue view of corporate purpose.
For a recent exposition of this debate and a critique of the shareholder value model, see
generally LvN STouT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: How PurrnNG SHAREHoLDERs FIRST
HAnus INVESTORS, CoRPoRATIoNs, AND THE Punuc (2012). For my take on the law of corpo-
rate purposes as applied to corporate diversity, see Sung Hui Kim, The Diversity Double Stan-
dard, 89 N.C. L. REv. 945, 977-88 (2011).
182 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
EcoN. 395, 420 (1983) ("[T]here is no reason why shareholders ... should have any inter-
est or expertise in managing the firm's affairs. Because of the easy availability of the exit
option through the stock market, the rational strategy for dissatisfied shareholders in most
cases, given the collective action problem, is to disinvest rather than incur costs in attempt-
ing to bring about change through the voting process.").
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ment departs from direct democracy by separating citizen ownership
of government from the politician's control of the process of gov-
erning."8 3 Similar to directors, legislators are, in essence, a collective
decision-making body of law-making specialists who have been ac-
corded broad discretion to use government power and assets. Al-
though legislators are charged with exercising their authority in the
best interests of citizens, citizens (like shareholders) have limited
means of holding their representatives accountable. Citizens cannot
compel their representatives to adhere to their platforms and cannot
revoke their cast votes. 18 Their primary means of residual control is
to vote their representatives out of office in periodic elections. Like
shareholders, citizens are also diffuse, dispersed, and face collective
action problems in monitoring their representatives. They can only
judge the performance of their representatives at a distance and only
with the imperfect assistance of the media. As a result, many choose
to remain rationally ignorant about their representatives'
performance.xas
In sum, directors are to shareholders as legislators are to citizens.
If there is a fiduciary relationship recognized in the former, it is rea-
sonable to recognize a fiduciary relationship in the latter.
3. Cases
Analogies to trustees or directors are nice, but if a judge wants to
recognize legislators as fiduciaries, he or she will feel more comforta-
ble citing to cases, at least as persuasive authority. It is not difficult to
locate cases in which government officials, defined broadly, are rhe-
torically called public trustees or held to be entrusted with public re-
sponsibilities.1 s6 And there are many cases in which courts hold
government officials to be fiduciaries of citizens.'8 7 Not surprisingly,
183 PAItTER, supra note 10, at 2.
184 See Leib & Ponet, Fiduciaty Representatiom supra note 163, at 187.
185 Cf Domi.o GREEN & IAN SHARmo, PA-rHoIES oF RAnoNAL CHOICE THEORY
94-95 (1994) (discussing the literature on the "rational ignorance hypothesis').
186 See, e.g., Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 450 (1874) ("The theory of our government is,
that all public stations are trusts, and that those clothed with them are to be animated in
the discharge of their duties solely by considerations of right, justice, and the public
good."); Providence Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. 45, 55 (1864) ("These offices are trusts,
held solely for the public good, and should be conferred from considerations of the ability,
integrity, fidelity, and fitness for the position of the appointee."); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d
694, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("It is a living tenet of our society and not mere rhetoric that a
public office is a public trust.").
187 See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 942, 961 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming
mail and wire fraud convictions of state lottery director and noting that state officials owe a
"fiduciary duty .. . to the state and its citizens" (quoting United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d
778, 784 n.4 (4th Cir. 1982) (affirming mail fraud conviction and noting that the Alcoholic
Beverage Control commissioner breached a fiduciary duty "owed to the state and its citi-
zens"))); United States v. Rebrook, 842 F. Supp. 891, 893-94 (S.D.W. Va. 1994) (holding
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there are fewer cases in which the government officials at issue are
elected and held to owe fiduciary duties to citizens who elected them, as
required under classical theory. In those cases, courts have recog-
nized a governor,ass mayors,8 9 an elected county clerk,o90 elected
county officials,' 9' and state legislators' 92 as fiduciaries of citizens.
For example, in Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co.,'" a unani-
mous Supreme Court of NewJersey announced that a cause of action
could lie against elected county officials for "abuse of discretion and
breach of trust" 94 in rubber-stamping a $12 million transaction
"under the influence of prominent persons seeking to further their
private interests." 95 Although the remedy granted did not depend on
a specific finding of a breach of duty, the court nevertheless
trumpeted the fiduciary obligations of both elected and appointed offi-
cials: "[Elected and appointed officials] stand in a fiduciary relation-
ship to the people whom they have been elected or appointed to
serve. As fiduciaries and trustees of the public weal they are under an
inescapable obligation to serve the public with the highest fidelity." 96
The basis for enforcing these obligations, according to the court,
rested on the sovereign power of the people of the State of New
Jersey:
These obligations are not mere theoretical concepts or idealistic ab-
stractions of no practical force and effect; they are obligations im-
posed by the common law on public officers and assumed by them
as a matter of law upon their entering public office. The enforce-
that attorney for West Virginia Lottery breached fiduciary duty owed to Lottery (a public
entity) and citizens of West Virginia by trading on material, nonpublic information relating
to contracts with third party vendors), revd, 58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir. 1995).
188 Soe e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1363 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that
the governor of Maryland owes fiduciary duties to Maryland citizens and the State of Mary-
land). After a series of vacations and rehearings, the Mandeldecision was superseded by 18
U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
189 See, .g., Jersey City v. Hague, 115 A.2d 8, 11 (N.J. 1955) (recognizing two mayors
and one deputy mayor as fiduciaries of the people whom they have been elected or ap-
pointed to serve).
19 See Cnty. of Cook v. Barrett, 344 N.E.2d 540, 545 (Ill. App. C. 1975) (holding that
the county clerk, as "an elected public official," was the fiduciary of the people of Cook
County).
191 See Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 86 A.2d 201, 221 (N.J. 1952) ("The
members of the board . .. are public officers holding positions of public trust. They stand
in a fiduciary relationship to the people whom they have been elected ... to serve.").
192 See Fuchs v. Bidwill, 334 N.E.2d 117, 119-20 (111. App. Ct. 1975) (discussing cases
treating state officials as trustees of the people), rev 1 on other grounds, 359 N.E.2d 158 (Ill.
1977).
1os 86 A.2d 201 (N.J. 1952).
194 Id. at 222-23. The court also noted that an official was not deserving 'of the trust
imposed upon him by the people of Burlington County when they elected him as a mem-
ber of their board of chosen freeholders." Id. at 212.
195 Id. at 207.
196 Id. at 221 (citations omitted).
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ment of these obligations is essential to the soundness and effi-
ciency of our government, which exists for the benefit of the people
who are its sovereign.197
Just as important, the court clarified that the governor, the attorney
general, and even private citizens all had standing to sue public officials
for breaching their obligations.xes
In Fuchs v. Bidwill, 99 the Illinois Appellate Court upheld a com-
plaint alleging that Illinois state legislators violated their fiduciary duty
to use their public office solely in the best interest of the people of
Illinois and not for private gain.200 The plaintiffs alleged that state
legislators secretly profited from unique investment opportunities of-
fered by a racetrack tycoon in an attempt to influence legislation relat-
ing to the licensing, regulating, and taxing of horse racing.201
The Court noted that "[ilt has long been agreed that public offi-
cials occupy positions of public trust" and that they "cannot use [their
office] directly or indirectly for personal profit."202 Moreover, "[t] hey
stand in a fiduciary relationship to the people [by] whom they have
been elected or appointed to serve." 203 Finally, the Court held that
private plaintiffs had standing to sue for their breach.2o It explained:
If the "public trust" doctrine is to have any meaning or vitality at all,
the members of the public, at least taxpayers who are the benefi-
ciaries of that trust, must have the right and standing to enforce it.
To tell them that they must wait upon governmental action is often
effectual denial of the right for all time. 205
On appeal, in a deeply divided four-to-three decision, the Illinois
Supreme Court reversed on the issue of private rights of action.206
However, the majority did not dispute the notion that state legislators
were fiduciaries of the citizens of Illinois. Indeed, notwithstanding
197 Id. at 222.
198 Id at 222 ("The citizen is not at the mercy of his servants holding positions of
public trust nor is he helpless to secure relief from their machinations except through the
medium of the ballot, the pressure of public opinion or criminal prosecution. He may
secure relief in the civil courts either through an action brought in his own name, or
through proceedings instituted on his behalf by the Governor ... or by the Attorney Gen-
eral ... ." (citations omritted)).
99 334 N.E.2d 117 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
200 The Illinois Supreme Court, in reversing the appellate court, quoted the com-
plaint, which specifically mentions the fiduciary duty. See Fuchs v. Bidwill, 359 N.E.2d 158,
160 (Ill. 1976).
201 Fuchs, 334 N.E.2d at 118-19.
202 Id. at 119.
203 Id. at 120 (quoting Jersey City v. Hague, 115 A.2d 8, 11 (N.J. 1955)).
204 Id. at 122.
05 Id. (quoting Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (1970)).
206 Fuchs v. Bidwill, 359 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ill. 1976) ("[Tlhe public interest will not be
served in permitting persons, without limitation, to institute actions of this nature against
public officials when the Attorney General has declined to act.").
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the holding, the majority declared that the Attorney General was enti-
tied to prosecute a breach of fiduciary duty action on behalf of the
State.207
To be sure, strictly speaking, it is not enough that the courts rec-
ognize elected officials as fiduciaries. After all, one's status as a fiduci-
ary does not mean that one is a fiduciary for all purposes. 208 To create
a cognizable claim, courts must also find that such a relationship im-
plies the requisite fiduciary duty under federal insider trading law.
Since Chiarella, courts have held that a defendant's failure to disclose
material, nonpublic information satisfies the necessary fraud element
of Rule 10b-5. 2so Thus, the requisite duty is the duty to disclose.
Once fiduciary status is found, imposing the duty to disclose in this
context should not be controversial because courts routinely and
widely place the duty to disclose on all fiduciaries. Judges can cite to
cases like United States v. Mandel, in which the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the Governor of the State of Maryland breached his
fiduciary duty to disclose his financial interest in a legislative matter
and that such failure "defraud[ed] the public and pertinent public
bodies of their intangible right to honest, loyal, faithful and disinter-
ested government" under the federal mail fraud statute. 210
As I have argued, judges can find legislators to be fiduciaries to
the citizens who elected them. Support can be found in suggestive
case law as well as two analogies: to private trustees and to corporate
directors. And this is precisely what is needed under the classical the-
ory: the finding of a breach of fiduciary duty between defendant
trader (a legislator) and the counterparty of the trade (a citizen on
the other side of the trade).
C. Fiduciary to Legislature
Now let's switch beneficiaries from citizens to the legislature (and
fellow legislators). This switch in beneficiaries requires a switch in
theories of liability, away from classical to misappropriation. Under
the misappropriation theory, the fiduciary relationship runs not to the
trading counterparties but to the source of nonpublic information. If
207 See id. (noting the Attorney General's ability to prosecute state officials' ethics viola-
tions and to "seek an accounting or the imposition of a constructive trust").
208 Se, eg., Agasha Mugasha, Evolving Standards of Conduct (Fiducimy Duty, Good Faith
and Reasonableness) and Commercial Certainty in Multi-Lender Contracts, 45 WAYNE L. REv, 1789,
1795-96 (2000) ("[In any particular analysis concerning the fiduciary principle, one has
to ascertain the subject matter over which fiduciary obligations extend. A fiduciary for
certain purposes need not be a fiduciary for all purposes; equally, a person who is generally
not a fiduciary can be a fiduciary for certain limited purposes." (footnote omitted)).
209 See supra section 1.A.2.a.
210 United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1363-64 (4th Cir. 1979). For direct history
of this case, see supra note 172.
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a fiduciary relationship exists between the legislator and that source,
there is a strong basis for imposing the duty not to use confidential
information for personal gain.21
1. Rule 10b5-2(b) Analysis
In 2000, in an attempt to clarify and perhaps to expand the scope
of the misappropriation theory, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-2.
Subsection (b) established three nonexclusive categories of relation-
ships that give rise to a fiduciary-like duty for purposes of the misap-
propriation theory. It provides that a duty of "trust or confidence"
exists where (1) there is an agreement to maintain confidentiality (2)
parties sharing material, nonpublic information have a "history, pat-
tern, or practice of sharing confidences" that leads to an actual or
reasonable expectation of nondisclosure; or (3) a person receives con-
fidential information from a close family member (i.e., one's "spouse,
parent, child or sibling") unless the recipient shows that there was no
actual or reasonable expectation of nondisclosure. 212
It is not clear the SEC achieved the clarification that it sought
because not all courts have deferred to the SEC's rule. For example,
in SEC v. Cuban, a federal district court rejected Rule 10b5-2(b) (1) as
going beyond the scope of Section 10(b).213 Also, in United States v.
Kim, another federal district court raised questions about the validity
of Rule I 0b5-2(b) (2), although it did not directly rule on the issue.214
But other courts have responded more positively. For example, in
SEC v. Yun, 21 5 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals approved in dicta
of both Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) and (2), although it signaled skepticism
about the reach of (3).216 Given this mixed judicial track record, Rule
10b5-2(b) should not be given talismanic significance in deciding
whether a fiduciary-like duty exists. That said, the rule provides some
guidance on factors possibly relevant to the fiduciary question.
211 There is no requirement that those owed a fiduciary obligation expressly proscribe
the exploitation of confidential information. LANGEVOORT, sape note 42, § 6:6, at 620.
212 SEC Rule 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b) (2011).
21s 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 730-31 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)
exceeds the SEC's statutory authority). On appeal, the judgment was vacated on other
grounds, with the Fifth Circuit clarifying that it was not reaching the validity of Rule 1Ob5-
2(b)(1). SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 558 n.40 (5th Cir. 2010).
214 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1014-15 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
215 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).
216 Id. at 1273 n.23 (noting that "the SEC's new rule goes farther than we do in finding
a relationship of trust and confidence (e.g., the new rule creates a presumption of a rela-
tionship of trust and confidentiality in the case of close family members)" and finding that
prior case law did not go that far). It should be noted that the case was technically not
governed by Rule 10b5-2. See id at 1281-82 (vacating the district court'sjudgment on the
basis of a prejudicial error in the jury instructions).
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What, then, does a straightforward application of Rule 10b5-2(b)
say about legislators? Recall that SEC Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) emphasizes
the existence of an agreement of confidentiality. For Congress, one
can find such an agreement in the Code of Ethics for Government
Service,'2 1 7 which provides, inter alia, that "[a]ny person in Govern-
ment Service should ... [n] ever use any information coming to him
confidentially in the performance of governmental duties as a means
for making private profit."2 1 8 For state legislators, similar obligations
may appear in state government ethics codes.
That said, basing a relationship of trust and confidence on a
mere confidentiality agreement remains deeply controversial219 and
thus may be the least likely of Rule 10b5-2(b)'s three categories to
survive further judicial scrutiny. As various commentators have noted,
an agreement to maintain the information's confidentiality is simply
not the same as a duty not to use such information for personal
gain,22 0 which is the relevant duty under misappropriation theory.
Moreover, nondisclosure agreements are often concluded by parties
that are negotiating at arms' length and clearly are not in any relation
of trust and confidence. 221 Such concerns explain the district court's
holding in SEC v. Cuban.2 2 2
However, legislators are not merely bound by an agreement of con-
fidentiality. Indeed, it seems highly probable that they have an actual
or reasonable expectation of nondisclosure arising out of a history or
pattern of sharing confidences, in accordance with Rule 10b5-2(b) (2).
How do we know whether such an expectation exists? Aside from in-
217 CODE OF Emics FOR GovERNENwr SERvIcE, 72 Stat. B12 (1958), H. Cong. Res. 175,
85th Cong., 104 Cong. Rec. 13556-57 (1958) [hereinafter CODE OF Emics]. The Code of
Ethics, which applies to "all Government employees, including officeholders,' id at B12,
has been incorporated into the House Ethics Manual. H. CoMs. ON STmNDADS or Oe
cGAL CONDUcT, 110th Cong., HOUSE Enrses MANuAL 20, 355 (2008) [hereinafter HousE
Ermics MANUAL], http://ethics.house.gov/Media/PDF/2008 House-Ethics Manual.pdf.
The Senate Ethics Manual lists the Code of Ethics as a source ofjurisdiction for the Senate
Ethics Committee. S. SELtCT COMM'N ON ETucs, 108th Cong., SENATE ETmics MANuAL 7-8
(2003), available at http://ethics.senate.gov/downloads/pdffiles/manual.pdf.
218 CODE OF ETmics supra note 217, at B12, 1 8; see George, supa note 9, at 167 (re-
counting the reprimand (based on Code of Ethics paragraph 8) of Representative Robert
Sikes "on charges including the purchase of stock in the privately-held First Navy Bank,
whose establishment he was also actively promoting at a Naval Air Station").
219 For example, some commentators have argued that congressional ethics rules pre-
scribing confidentiality are distinguishable from ethics rules commonly found in employee
policy manuals. See Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway, supra note 9, at 296. The implication is
that congressional ethics rules may not be enforceable contractual provisions.
220 See, e.g., Nagy, Gradual Demise supra note 42, at 1362.
221 Jd
222 SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 724, 730-31 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that
misappropriation theory required that the trader agree both to keep the information con-
fidential and to not use the information for personal gain). On Cuban, see supra note 213
and accompanying text.
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formal, anecdotal evidence,223 written internal procedures suggest
that legislators observe a norm of confidentiality at least with respect
to certain sensitive information.
For example, for Congress, the Senate's Standing Rules strongly
suggest a pattern of sharing confidences and an internally enforceable
norm of confidentiality. Rule 29.5 provides:
Any Senator, officer or employee of the Senate who shall disclose
the secret or confidential business or proceedings of the Senate,
including the business and proceedings of the committees, subcom-
mittees[,j and offices of the Senate shall be liable, if a Senator, to
suffer expulsion from the body, and if an officer or employee, to
dismissal from the service of the Senate, and to punishment for
contempt.224
When the Senate was debating the 1992 Amendment to Rule
29.5, one senator referred to norms of both trust and confidentiality
among senators:
[C]andid discussions among Members depend upon a trust that is
based, in part, on a willingness of all Members to abide by the prac-
tices of the Senate.... The unilateral decision by a Member or
employee to release confidential committee information is inconsis-
tent with the Senate's practice of making such decisions openly and
collectively. Arrogation of this responsibility by individuals can de-
stroy mutual trust among Members and be harmful to this
institution.225
The Standing Rules also provide that committee proceedings may
be closed to the public if the matters to be discussed fall under one of
several listed categories where the need for preserving confidentiality
is great.226 One of those enumerated categories covers trade secrets
and other highly confidential financial information,227 suggesting that
223 See Barbabefla et al., supra note 10, at 221-22 (reporting evidence that "legislators
may feel that trading on information obtained through their positions is inappropriate,
even if they do not believe it is illegal").
224 STANDING RuLts OF THE SENATE, S. Doc. No. 106-15, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., Rule
XXIX, cl 5 (2000) [hereinafter SmarEt STANDING Ruas]; see George, supra note 9, at
167-68 (interpreting this Rule).
225 138 CoNG. REc. S17835, S17836 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. Mitch-
ell). This testimony is also recounted in George, supra note 9, at 168-69.
226 The categories include "matters necessary to be kept secret in the interests of na-
tional defense or the confidential conduct of the foreign relations of the United States,"
SENATE STANDING RULES, Rule XXVI, cl. 5(b)(1) (2000), matters which "will represent a
clearly unwarranted invasion of the privacy of an individual," idA at cl. 5(b)(3), matters
which "will disclose the identity of any informer or law enforcement agent or will disclose
any information relating to the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense that is
required to be kept secret in the interests of effective law enforcement," id at cl. 5(b) (4),
and "matters required to be kept confidential under other provisions of law or Govern-




senators do have ready access to inside information and not just mar-
ket information.
Turning to the House of Representatives, various House rules
suggest that representatives observe a norm of confidentiality with re-
spect to certain communications. 228 Although official committee and
subcommittee meetings "for the transaction of business" are generally
open to the public,m other communications may remain hidden
from public view. These other communications are governed by Jef-
ferson's Manual of Parliamentary Procedure,m9 which provides that
"it is entirely within rule and usage for a committee to conduct its
proceedings in secret, and the House itself may not abrogate the se-
crecy of a committee's proceedings except by suspending the rule"
governing secrecy.2 s1
Also, the House has an internal set of guidelines on what infor-
mation is confidential. 232 According to these guidelines, confidential
information includes: information, the "inappropriate disclosure of"
which would "adversely reflect on the credibility of the House or of-
fice"; information relating to "specific legislative action taken or con-
sidered by the office"; information "provided to the House in
confidence or with restrictions on its use (i.e., trade secrets, commer-
cial or financial information) from an individual, private entity, or
state or federal entity"; and "intra-[H]ouse" communications. 233
The above evidence suggests that federal legislators observe a
norm of secrecy with respect to certain information, including finan-
cial or commercial information, obtained on a confidential basis.
State legislative procedures might also provide evidence of confidenti-
ality norms among state legislators. To the extent that a court agrees
228 See, e.g., RuLEs OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 108-241, 108th
Cong. 2d Sess., Rule XVII, cl. 9 (2005) ("[When the Speaker or a Member .. . informs the
House that he has communications that he believes ought to be kept secret for the present,
the House shall be cleared of all persons except the Members ... for the reading of such
communications, and debates and proceedings thereon , , . .").
229 Id. at Rule XI, cl. 2(g)(1) (open meetings and hearings). Closed door meetings
are allowed for meetings of the Committee on Ethics or its subcommittees and where dis-
closure of information would, among other things, (i) "endanger national security," (ii)
"compromise sensitive law enforcement information," or (iii) "violate a law or rule of the
House." Id.
230 THomAsJEFFERSON, A MANuAL oF PARuAmENTARY PRAcrICE (1801), eprinted in H.R.
Doc. No. 107-284, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2003), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
hrm/browse_108.hunl [hereinafter JEFHERsoN, MANUAL4 see also Orrin G. Hatch, judicial
Nomination Filibuster Cause and Cume 2005 UTAm L. REv. 803, 827-28 n.128 (2005) (noting
that the Manual still governs the House today).
231 JEFFERSON, MANUAL, supra note 230, at sec. XI (annotation) (citation omitted).
232 SeeUNrro STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES I.FORMnON SECURlY PUBUCATION,
GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING INFORMATION SENSITIrry, available at http://web.archive.
org/web/20061215031815/http:/www.house.gov/cao-opp/PDFSolicitations/HISPUB008.
pdf [hereinafter House Information Sensitivity Guidelines].
233 George supra note 9, at 169 (quoting House Information Sensitivity Guidelines).
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with the SEC about the relevance of the factors listed in Rule lOb5-
2(b)(1) and (2), those factors cut in favor of finding a duty of trust
and confidence between legislators and fellow legislators on the one
hand, and between legislators and the legislature on the other.
2. Analogy: Partner
Regardless of Rule 10b5-2(b), a court could recognize legislators
as fiduciaries by analogizing to the relationships among fellow part-
ners to one another and to the partnership itself. Of course, there are
different types of partnerships with different attributes to be com-
pared. For purposes of this analogy, I am concerned only with the
oldest form of partnership-the general partnership. Under the Re-
vised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), which thirty-seven states have
adopted,234 partners are both agents and principals of the partnership
and thereby owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to one another
and to the partnership itself, whether or not they are acting as manag-
ers or agents.2 3 5
Accordingly, in SEC v. Peters,"* a federal district court found that
a partner potentially violated federal insider trading laws under the
misappropriation theory by trading on confidential information en-
trusted to him by his partner.2 7 And in O'Hagan, the federal insider
trading case in which the Supreme Court affirmed the misappropria-
tion theory itself, the Court held that the defendant, a partner of the
law firm of Dorsey & Whitney, breached his fiduciary duty owed to the
partnership.238 The fiduciary nature of the partner-partner/partner-
partnership relationship is so well established that courts often refer
to it as the touchstone of comparison in resolving novel cases. For
example, in an insider trading case, SEC v. Sargent, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals declared that the two sole shareholders of a closely
held corporation were fiduciaries of each other because their mutual
duties "mirror [ed] those owed between partners in a partnership."239
234 Partnership Act, UNroan LAw CommsioN, available at http://www.uniforniaws.
org/Act.aspx?tide=Partnership+Act (last visited Feb. 16, 2013) (showing a map of states
that have adopted RUPA).
235 See RUPA § 404(a) (2006). But cf Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiducianes?, 2005
U. It. L. REv. 209, 251 (2005) (arguing that partners should be subject to fiduciary duties
"only as agents or as managers of centrally managed firms").
236 735 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Kan. 1990).
237 Id. at 1521 (finding enough evidence of a violation to withstand summary judg-
ment, although relevant information did not relate to the partnership business but to a
side business of the partner who confided information); see SEC v. Michel, 521 F. Supp. 2d
795, 826 (N.D. III. 2007) (finding that a partner-partner relationship constituted the rele-
vant relationship of trust and confidence under misappropriation theory).
238 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 & n.7 (1997).
239 SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68,76 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 1975)).
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What are the important partnership characteristics? Under
RUPA, a partnership is an "association of two or more persons to carry
on as co-owners a business for profit . .. whether or not the persons
intend to form a partnership."240 In most jurisdictions, co-ownership
requires a mutual undertaking of the parties to share in the profits
and control of the business.24' In some jurisdictions, the parties must
also agree to share losses. 242
Can we analogize the legislature to a partnership? Let us take
Congress as the example, although the analysis is similar for state leg-
islatures. At first glance, we notice that Congress is not (at least not
ostensibly) a profit-making enterprise, so the requirement that part-
ners agree to share in the profits or losses of the business seems not to
be met. But if we look beyond the technical expression of the rule, we
see that the broader purpose of an agreement to share profits or
losses is for the parties to link their economic fates (and thus their
future livelihoods) with the fate of the enterprise as a whole and to
one another. If we relax the profit-making assumption, we see that
members of Congress, too, have undertaken a common venture-that
of legislating for our nation. Members have left their districts and
voluntarily tied their careers to those of other members and that of
Congress as a whole. Legislation that is passed by both chambers of
Congress and not vetoed by the President is binding on individual
members, Congress itself, and the federal government. Also, the gen-
eral reputation of Congress will impact the fate of the individual legis-
lator come reelection. In this sense, the fates of members are linked
together in the common enterprise of lawmaking.
Further, members of Congress share in the control of the legisla-
ture just as partners share in the control of the business. As a result,
in both cases, a division of labor necessarily arises, as no single mem-
ber or partner can perform all the tasks required of their common
undertaking. For partnerships, some partners will contribute the cap-
ital while others contribute their labor. The default rule for partner-
ships, however, is that they all vote on partnership matters.245
240 RUPA § 202(a).
241 For an example of the traditional approach, see Ziegler v. Dahl, 691 N.W.2d 271,
275-77 (N.D. 2005); DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENoy, PARTNERSHIPS, ANo LLCs: EXAMPLES
AND EXPLANATIONs 220-21 (3d ed. 2008) (describing the "key characteristics" of a partner-
ship in most jurisdictions).
242 See e.g., Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 372, 403-04 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (requiring a showing of "the parties' sharing of profits and losses"); Ingram v. Deere,
288 S.W.3d 886, 894 (Tex. 2009) (requiring an agreement to share losses); Gates v. Hous-
ton, 897 N.E.2d 532 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (requiring a voluntary contract of association for
the purpose of sharing "profits and losses").
245 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, The Evolving Paitnership 24 (Univ. of Ill. Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. LEO64025, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=940653 (summarizing the default rules).
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Similarly, for Congress, members are assigned to and spend much of
their time deliberating in various congressional committees or sub-
committees.244 But all members participate in floor debates and vote
on legislation.
None of the above is to say that members of Congress are as a
factual matter cordial and collegial to one another. Just as a partner-
ship can be discordant and dysfunctional, Congress can be and has
been discordant and dysfunctional. But harmony in fact has never
been a required element for imposing fiduciary duties. For example,
courts have imposed fiduciary duties on partners already in strained
relations245 and on couples on the brink of divorce.2 4 6 Indeed, a ma-
jor purpose of fiduciary law is to protect against abuses arising in such
antagonistic contexts. Also, despite popular perceptions to the con-
trary, members of Congress are in a nontrivial sense engaged in ajoint
undertaking and must come together in order to discuss and pass leg-
islation. Moreover, as the evidence of norms summoned in Part II.C.1
above suggests, members actually do cooperate with one another in
keeping certain information confidential.
Under the misappropriation theory, judges can classify legislators
as fiduciaries to fellow legislators and to the legislature itself. The
SEC's Rules 10b5-2(b) (1) and (2) provide some support. More im-
portantly, for purposes of this Article, judges can draw an analogy to a
paradigm example of a fiduciary relationship: fellow partners and the
partnership.247
D. Fiduciary to Government
Let's switch beneficiaries one final time. Under the misappropri-
ation theory, are legislators fiduciaries to the government they serve?
1. Analogy: Director (to Corporation)
Recall that I've already analogized legislators to directors for pur-
poses of the classical theory. In that discussion, I argued that just as
244 For example, in trial testimony, Congressman Barney Frank once testified that
"members of the House of Representatives tend to specialize and often trust the judgment
of colleagues about the contents of noncontroversial bills" and that "a typical Representa-
tive might know the contents of less than ten percent of the bills considered by the House."
United States v. Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531, 1541 (11th Cir. 1992).
245 See, e.g.,Johnson v. Peckham, 120 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex. 1938).
246 Vai v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 364 P.2d 247, 252 (Cal. 1961) ("[B]ut
the husband's fiduciary duties in respect to his wife's interest in the community property
continue as long as his control of that property continues, notwithstanding the complete
absence of confidence and trust, and the consequent termination of the confidential
relationship.").
247 Even if one rejects this line of argument as being too facile, the analogy to partners
serves as an important reminder that oft-cited factors-such as "superiority" and "domina-
tion"-are not essential to all fiduciary relationships.
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directors are fiduciaries to their shareholders, legislators can be seen
as fiduciaries to the citizenry. Here, under the misappropriation the-
ory, I argue that legislators are fiduciaries to the government they
serve, from which they receive material, nonpublic information. The
corporate analogy is that directors are fiduciaries to the corporation.
Accordingly, in SEC v. Talhot24 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a director could violate federal insider trading laws under
the misappropriation theory by trading on confidential information
relating to another company in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the
corporation, which was the "immediate source and rightful owner of
the information."249
Because it is well established that directors have a fiduciary obli-
gation to the corporation, the task here is to explain why we should
compare legislators with directors. Under the theory of director pri-
macy,250 directors reign supreme over corporate actions. To be sure,
on a daily basis, officers make the operational decisions. But, as a
formal legal matter, directors have the ultimate power to make deci-
sions on behalf of the corporation. Legislators arguably stand in a
similar position vis-A-vis the government they serve. Especially rele-
vant is the fact that legislatures tend to have broad jurisdiction to legis-
late in the public interest. 251 Moreover, they typically enjoy the power
of the purse and control the funding of government projects.252
The strongest objection comes from the fact that both federal
and state governments separate powers among three coequal
branches of government-not only the legislative but also the judicial
and executive. To take Congress as an example, it is hard to say that
Congress reigns supreme over the actions of the federal government
when the judiciary can strike down statutes as unconstitutional. Also,
the executive branch in various domains enjoys de jure and de facto
power that rivals Congress's.
That said, it is difficult to suggest that judges and executive offi-
cials are more like directors than legislators are. Judges, even the
judges of the highest court, do not fit the mold. Their power is too
sharply delimited in terms ofjurisdiction, while their decision-making
process is too narrowly cabined by precedent and stare decisis. The
President and high-level executive branch officials also behave more
248 530 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008).
249 Id. at 1094.
250 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Psimacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Govern-
ane, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547, 550-51 (2003) (describing the director-primacy model).
251 Congress has wide-ranging authority under the Commerce Clause. U.S. CoNsT. art.
I, § 8. State legislatures generally enjoy a wide-ranging police power to legislate in the
public interest. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. X.
252 Congress's power here stems from the Taxing and Spending Clause, U.S. CONsr.
art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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like corporate officers than directors. On the other hand, executive
branch officials often do not and need not answer to Congress in the
way that a corporate officer must (at least formally) answer to the
board. In the end, I can defend only a weaker position-that no
other body (including the other two coequal branches of govern-
ment) stands in a clearly superior position to the legislature with re-
spect to its claim to "direct" the nation or the state. If judges are
persuaded, then they can analogize a legislator's duty to the govern-
ment to a director's duty to the corporation.253
2. Cases
In addition to this analogy, there are some relevant precedents.
Myriad opinions find public officials to be fiduciaries of their federal,
state, or municipal government, or, in some cases, the government
agency that employed them. For example, at the federal level, courts
have imposed fiduciary obligations on an army engineer,254 an em-
ployee of the Department of Agriculture,25 5 a foreign service of-
ficer,256 a civilian employee of the United States Engineers,25 7 a real
estate appraiser for the Federal Housing Administration,258 a presi-
dent and vice president of Export-Import Bank of the United
States,259 a CIA agent,2o and an Interior Secretary.261 At the state and
local level, courts have imposed fiduciary obligations on an attorney
and director of the state lottery,262 a state alcoholic beverage commis-
25$ One can also argue that members are fiduciaries to the government by virtue of
being employees of their government. Nagy makes just this argument, although she con-
cedes that members of Congress are not quite like the employees working on their staffs, a
point with which I agree. See Nagy, Congressional Officials, supra note 10, at 1156-57. I
would add that there are many other reasons to think that legislators are not mere employ-
ees and, in fact, look much more like employers. As I have already argued, there is more
than a passing resemblance between legislators and corporate directors, and directors are
not generally treated as employees, for example under Title VII. See, e.g., Clackamas Gas-
troenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 450-51 (2003) (holding that physicians
who were both directors and shareholders of a corporation should not be counted as em-
ployees). More generally, "[d]irectors are traditionally employer rather than employee
positions." Chavero v. Local 241, Div. of the Amalgamated Transit Union, 787 F.2d 1154,
1157 (7th Cir. 1986).
254 United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 305 (1910).
255 United States v. Drisko, 303 F. Supp. 858, 860 (E.D. Va. 1969).
256 United States v. King, 469 F. Supp. 167, 167 (D.S.C. 1979).
257 United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1961).
258 United States v. Kenealy, 487 F. Supp. 1379, 1379 (D. Mass. 1980), afld 646 F.2d
699 (1st Cir. 1981).
259 United States v. Kearns, 595 F.2d 729, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
260 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510 (1980).
261 United States v. Pan-Am. Petroleum Co., 55 F.2d 753, 756, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1932).
262 United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1995) (director of state lottery);




sioner,2** a state land commissioner, 264 a fire department chief,2 6* a
city treasurer,'2o a city press secretary and director of public rela-
tions,2 67 and a city attorney.268
Moreover, courts have not reserved the fiduciary status solely for
appointed officials. Elected officials, such as a mayor,269 a gover-
nor,27o and a city councilman, 27' have also been recognized as fiducia-
ries of their state or municipality.
If we focus on Congress, the case of United States v. PodelF72 -
which has never been cited in the scholarly commentary on insider
trading2 7a-provides clear authority for the proposition that members
of Congress are fiduciaries of the United States. In this case, Con-
gressman Podell pled guilty to federal bribery charges under 18 U.S.C.
§ 203,274 after which the federal government filed a civil action to re-
cover the improper payments he had received.275
In granting the government's summary judgment motion, the
federal district court carefully clarified that this civil action was not
grounded in Podell's criminal violation but rather was based on a
breach of fiduciary duty "as evidenced by [the criminal violation]"276
and "not on any federal statutory authority."277 The court declared
that Podell was a fiduciary of the US government and, interestingly,
did so by invoking an analogy to the master-servant relationship:
A public official stands in a fiduciary relationship with the United
States, through those by whom he is appointed or elected. If he
secretly advances interests adverse to those of the government which
he serves, it is a breach of confidence and he must account to his
263 United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778, 780, 784 n.4 (4th Cir. 1982).
264 Williams v. State ex ret Morrison, 315 P.2d 981, 981 (Ariz. 1957).
265 City of Minneapolis v. Canterbury, 142 N.W. 812, 813-14 (Minn. 1913).
266 City of Boston v. Dolan, 10 N.E.2d 275, 278, 281 (Mass. 1937).
267 United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 641, 643 (1975).
268 City of Hastings v. Jerry Spady Pontiac-Cadillac, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 369, 369 (Neb.
1982).
269 City of Boston v. Santosuosso, 30 N.E.2d 278, 306 (Mass. 1940).
270 United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1362-63 (4th Cir. 1979); Agnew v. State,
446 A.2d 425, 440-41 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
271 United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 538, 545 (7th Cir. 1975).
272 436 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
273 While not cited in the scholarly literature, this case was mentioned in congressional
testimony. See Stop Trading on Congresional Knowledge Act: Hearing on H.R 1148 Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Jack Maskell, Legislative Att'y,
Cong. Research Serv.).
274 The statute prohibits members of Congress from accepting compensation for "any
representational services ... in relation to any. . . matter in which the United States is a
party." 18 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1) (2006).
275 See Podell 436 F. Supp. at 1040.
276 Id. at 1042.
277 &
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"master" for the benefits received as a result, irrespective of consid-
eration of fraud or damage.278
In sum, under the misappropriation theory, judges can classify
legislators as fiduciaries of the government that they serve. Support
can be found in numerous judicial opinions recognizing public offi-
cials, including elected officials, as fiduciaries. As for members of
Congress, Podell provides direct precedent for classifying members as
fiduciaries of the US government. More importantly, judges can draw
an analogy to the fiduciary relationship between a director and the
corporation that he serves.
Now that I've marshaled support for finding legislators to be fidu-
ciaries of their legislature, of fellow legislators, and of their govern-
ment under the misappropriation theory, the task is to justify
imposing the specific duty not to use entrusted confidential informa-
tion for personal gain, which is the relevant duty for the misappropria-
tion theory and tipping cases. Unlike the fiduciary duty to disclose,
which is routinely applied to all fiduciaries, the scope of the duty not
to use entrusted information for personal gain may vary from one fi-
duciary context to another. While it is uncontroversial to proscribe
the exploitation of information that harms or injures the beneficiary,
it is slightly more controversial to proscribe the exploitation of infor-
mation regardless of whether injury can be demonstrated.279 The
question about harms is relevant because whether insider trading
harms anyone has been the subject of intense scholarly debate.280
That debate will not be settled here, although I have discussed the
harms of insider trading elsewhere. 28' For purposes of this Article,
suffice it to say that courts have regularly imposed duties on public
fiduciaries without requiring any showing of harm.282 Moreover,
278 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
279 That said, under federal insider trading law, a demonstration of potential injury
should be enough. LANGEVOORT, supra note 42, § 6:8, at 6-34.1. Also, the O'Fagan Coures
lack of significant discussion about harms-apart from the harms to the integrity of the
securities markets--might be read to suggest that harmfulness of this type of breach of the
duty of loyalty is presumed. See id. § 6:8, at 6-34.1 to -35.
280 S e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic
Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REv. 35, 36-37 (1986) (sunmarizing the debate on whether the
insider trading prohibition has a "rational basis" at all); William KS. Wang, Trading on
Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue
Whom Under SEC Rule lOb-5?, 54 S. CAuF. L. REv. 1217, 1225-29 (1981) (summarizing the
respective cases for and against regulating insider trading).
281 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
282 See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 305 (1910) ("It is immate-
rial . .. whether the complainant was able to show that it had suffered any actual loss
. .. ."); Cnty. of Cook v. Barrett, 344 N.E.2d 540, 548 (Ill. App. 1975) ("The absence of an
allegation of damage is immaterial."); Jersey City v. Hague, 115 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1955) ("It
would be a dangerous precedent to lay down as law that unless some affirmative fraud or
loss can be shown, the agent may hold on to any secret benefit ... out of his agency."
(quoting Carter, 217 U.S. at 306)); see also cases discussed infra Part iIC.
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courts have found liability based on the public fiduciary's use of en-
trusted information for personal gain, without requiring that harm be
demonstrated. 28 3
I have argued that the majority view-that judges could not rec-
ognize legislators as fiduciaries under federal insider trading law-is
wrong and continues to be wrong. Legislators can be deemed fiducia-
ries to citizens, the legislature (and fellow legislators), and the govern-
ment that they serve. By analyzing congressional ethics rules, citing
relevant cases, and analogizing to trustees, partners, and directors,
courts could classify legislators as fiduciaries and impose the requisite
fiduciary duties under federal insider trading law. Courts could do so
regardless of and in addition to the STOCK Act. They could do so




Part II was mostly an extended exercise in analogical reasoning.
The question presented was whether legislators could be deemed "fi-
duciaries" under pre-STOCK Act federal insider trading law and how
this might be done. The way that I answered that question was to cite
relevant cases-such as Driscoll Fuchs, and Podell-and also to elabo-
rate point-by-point analogies to private trustees, corporate directors,
and partners. This sort of analogical reasoning is what judges and
lawyers do every day. Its persuasiveness is often intuitive and aesthetic:
is there some flash of recognition between legislators and, say, corpo-
rate directors?
But the fact that analogies somehow "click" does not necessarily
mean that they are well reasoned. For example, Tamar Frankel has
criticized fiduciary law's reliance on analogies as "uninstructive, be-
283 See, eg., United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 545 (7th Cir. 1975) (finding that use
of governmental information by city councilman for personal gain amounts to a breach of
fiduciary duty which is actionable under mail fraud statute); United States v. Rebrook, 842
F. Supp. 891, 893-94 (S.D.W. Va. 1994) (rejecting defendant's argument that loss must be
alleged in order to state a claim under the wire fraud statute and finding liability under
such statute for misuse of confidential information gained by virtue of one's position);
Williams v. State ex re Morrison, 315 P.2d 981, 984-85 (Ariz. 1957) (noting that the com-
missioner "used the information obtained from such examination for his personal profit"
and thus "did not truly and faithfully perform all of his official duties and consequendy
breached the conditions of his bond, and the surety is liable"); City of Minneapolis v. Can-
terbury, 142 N.W. 812, 814 (Minn. 1913) (holding that the fire department chief, as agent
of the city, must disgorge profits accrued from sale of land to the city when he purchased
such land based on information gleaned by virtue of his position, regardless of whether the
principal is or is not benefited thereby).
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cause the courts do not explain why some similarities . .. are relevant
and others not."284 In recent legal academic discussion, various
schools of thought have surfaced on the nature of analogical reason-
ing.28 5 I concur with Judge Richard Posner, who understands analo-
gies as ultimately rhetorical acts that can be justified only by looking
to some underlying policy or purpose of the law that is to be applied
and extended.286 Accordingly, in order to provide a deeper justifica-
tion for the analogies offered above, I need to unpack the underlying
policy or purpose that animates fiduciary law.
In this Part, my basic claim is that it is entirely appropriate and
consistent with the law of fiduciary obligation to recognize legislators
as fiduciaries and to impose on them the requisite duties. To support
this claim, I defend a plausible definition of (public) corruption as
the "use of public office for private gain," and I show how legislator
insider trading fits that definition. I then demonstrate that one core
purpose behind the common law of fiduciaries is to deter corruption.
Although prior commentary has casually observed some link between
fiduciary principles and preventing corruption,8 7 this is the first sys-
tematic demonstration of that connection. To make this showing, I
explore one strand of cases in fiduciary law targeting corruption in
the public sector. These cases forbid the public fiduciaries in ques-
tion from using their public positions for private gain. In the end, I
show an organic alignment between recognizing legislator insider
trading as a breach of fiduciary duty and one core purpose of the
common law of fiduciaries. This alignment provides a deeper justifi-
cation for the analogies offered above.2 8*
In discussing the purposes and policies undergirding fiduciary
law and in classifying legislator insider trading as a form of corrup-
284 Frankel, supra note 147, at 805.
285 See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational
Force ofLegal Argument by Analogy, 109 HAnv. L REv. 923, 962-66 (1996) (discussing differ-
ent forms of analogical reasoning); Richard A. Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 CoRNELL L.
REv. 761, 761-65 (2006) (reviewing LLoYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REAsoN' THE UsE oF ANAL,
OGY AND LEGAL ARGuMENT (2005)) (concluding that reasoning by analogy is just a form of
judicial and lawyerly rhetoric rather than a substantive statement of law); Cass R. Sunstein,
Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning 106 HARv. L. REv. 741, 742 (1993) (defending ana-
logical reasoning over various other methods of legal thought).
286 As Judge Posner puts it
There is no such thing as an "analogical argument" in any but a rhetorical
sense; you need reasons to determine whether one case should be thought
relevantly similar to another. Analogies are not reasons; reasons are what is
necessary to determine whether a similarity shall be treated as a ground for
action, an analogy guiding decision.
Posner, supra note 285, at 768.
287 See, e.g., FINN, supra note 133, at 214 (observing that fiduciary law's objection to
bribes and secret commissions "lies in their corrupting tendency").
288 Part III is severable from Part II. If the reader needs nothing more to be convinced
to find the fiduciary duty, the reader should skip to Part IV, where I address objections.
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tion, readers may jump to the conclusion that I am making some
global, untethered evaluation that legislator insider trading is bad and
thus should be banned. Although I believe this to be true and have
argued the point elsewhere,m89 that is not my task here. As noted in
the Introduction, my ultimate task is to ask whether judges, if con-
fronted with a case of legislator insider trading, could find legislators
to be fiduciaries within the meaning of federal insider trading law us-
ing ordinary judicial reasoning. Above, I answered that question in
the affirmative. Below, I make an even stronger case by showing that
the analogies invoked did not trade on trivial, coincidental, or arbi-
trary similarities like the fact that zebras and barber poles both have
stripes. Instead, judges can justify the analogies on the ground that
extending the category of fiduciary to encompass legislators promotes
an underlying policy of fiduciary law, which is to combat
corruption.2mo
B. Corruption
As Justice Potter Stewart said of obscenity, people seem to know
public corruption when they see it, but it is hard to define.29x One
source of difficulty lies in the fact that what counts as corruption is
historically contingent. For example, today it is uncontroversial to say
that a legislator accepting a bribe is corrupt. But in the nineteenth
century, members of Congress openly accepted payments from com-
panies lobbying to obstruct or advance particular legislation. For in-
289 See Kim, Governmental Insider Trading supra note 34.
2oo Careful readers might object that I have lost track of what is really important, that
the relevant policy consideration is not of fiduciary law generally but of insider trading law,
which happens to bar such trading only when it breaches a fiduciary-like duty. But such an
objection implicitly assumes that insider trading law and fiduciary law have substantially
different goals. To the contrary, as I have argued below, one of the important goals of
fiduciary law is to stop corruption. And, as I argue in a companion piece, insider trading
law can best be theoretically rationalized as an attempt to stop one form of private corrup-
tion. See Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption (Mar. 22, 2013) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author). Accordingly, extending the fiduciary category to
include legislators in a manner consistent with a core purpose of fiduciary law (anti-corrup-
tion) will be consistent with the purpose of federal insider trading law (also anti-corrup-
tion). Finally, it is my view that when the Supreme Court in Chiarella expressly predicated
insider trading liability on a breach of fiduciary duty, it intended to incorporate the pur-
poses of fiduciary law.
291 See, e.g., Michael A. Genovese, Praidential Comption: A LongitudinalAnalysis, in Cow
RurnoN AND AMERIcAN Pourncs 135, 136 (Michael A. Genovese & Victoria Farrar-Myers
eds., 2010) [hereinafter CORRUTION AND AmRCAN PounclS (l[T]here is no commonly
accepted definition of what constitutes corruption."); Michael Johnston, The Definitions De-
bate: Old Conflicts in New Guises, in THE PotrncAt EcONOMY OF CORRUPTION 11, 12 (Arvind
K. Jain ed., 2001) ("No one has ever devised a universally satisfying 'one-line definition' of
corruption."); Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perrptions of Comption and Campaign Fi-
nance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Lao, 153 U. PA. L REv. 119, 126-27
(2004) (noting that corruption means different things to the different Supreme Court
Justices).
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stance, Daniel Webster was on retainer from the Bank of the United
States to represent the bank's interests, and he unabashedly sent writ-
ten reminders to replenish his bank account.292 Indeed, it was not
until 1853 that congressional bribery was formally banned.29 3 And
even after the ban, bribed members went undisciplined until public
outrage erupted over the Credit Mobilier bribery scandal in the 1870s,
which impelled Congress to begin censuring them.2 9 4 Not until more
than a century later, in 1980, did the House finally expel a member
for bribery.295
Also, what counts as corruption is culturally contingent.29 Socie-
ties maintain different political systems with differing notions of ac-
countability, cultivate different institutions of power with varying
degrees of maturity and legitimacy, negotiate different boundaries be-
tween public and private domains, and draw on diverse relationships
between power and wealth. Accordingly, societies necessarily experi-
ence corruption in diverse ways, making it difficult to define both pre-
cisely and universally. As John Kleinig and William C. Heffernan have
concluded: "Both historically and cross-culturally, instantiations of
corruption have been contested, not only with respect to their identity
but also, in certain instances, with respect to their undesirability."297
292 Daniel Webster, who served in the House and Senate and as Secretary of State,
once reminded the President of the Bank of the United States: "If it be wished that my
relation to the Bank should be continued, it may be well to send me the usual retainers."
THE CORRESPONDENCE OF NICHOLAS BIDDLE 218 (Reginald C. McGrane ed., 1919) (Webster
to Biddle, Dec. 21, 1833).
293 See DENNIS F. THOMPsON, ETmics IN CoNGREss: FROM INDIVIDUAL, TO INSTITUTIONAL
CoRRu'rroN 2 (1995).
294 See id.
295 The House voted unanimously to expel Michael J. "Ozzie" Myers, a Pennsylvania
Democrat who accepted bribes in an undercover ABSCAM investigation. This was the
House's first expulsion for corruption. Id. Four years earlier, the House failed to expel
AndrewJ. Hinshaw, a California Republican who had been convicted of accepting a bribe.
Id.
296 SeejENs CH. ANDvIG & ODD-HELGE FJELDsTAD wITH INGE AMUNosEN. TONE SISSENER
& TINA SOREIDE, CORRUPTION: A REVIEW oF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 46 (2001) ("[W]hat is
seen as corruption varies from one country to another."). That said, as Robert Klitgaard
notes, "[olver a wide range of 'corrupt' activities, there is little argument that they are
wrong and socially harmful," even across societies. ROBERT KLrTrAARD, CONTROLUNG COR-
RUPTION 4 (1988).
297 John Kleinig & William C. Heffernan, The Corruptibility of Comption, in PRvATE AND
Puauc ContrrpoN 3, 3 (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2004). The authors
note:
Even if we confine ourselves to what we now familiarly speak of as public
corruption, it soon becomes clear that what "we" consider to be corrupt is
often contentiously so. One group's perquisite is another's corruption; one
group's tradition of patronage is another's nepotism; one group's cam-





And even within a single society at a particular moment in time,
there will be disagreement about what counts as corruption. For ex-
ample, elites differ from the general public in what they regard as
corrupt.2 9 8 Also, factors such as race, education, and income affect
the likelihood of perceiving the government to be corrupt. 299
Given such contingencies and controversies, my goal is not to
proffer and defend some best definition of public corruption, which
would attempt to specify a strict set of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions that capture all instances of what people regard as corruption
with no over- or under-inclusiveness. Indeed, the cognitive science of
categorization casts serious doubt on the success of any such pro-
ject.o00 Instead, I offer something more modest: a definition that
draws on rough consensus in the political science and political econ-
omy literatures, incorporates less contested cultural understandings,
and performs useful analytic work in the narrow context of insider
trading.
I start with the "classical" understanding of public corruption in
political science. As Dennis Thompson explains:
In the tradition of political theory, corruption is a disease of the
body politic. like a virus invading the physical body, hostile forces
spread through the political body, enfeebling the spirit of the laws
and undermining the principles of the regime. The form the virus
takes depends on the form of govemment it attacks. In regimes of a
more popular cast, such as republics and democracies, the virus
shows itself as private interests. Its agents are greedy individuals,
contentious factions, and mass movements that seek to control col-
lective authority for their own purposes. The essence of cormuption in
this conception is the pollution of the public by the private.s
298 See MatthewJ. Streb & April K. Clark, The Public and Political Corrption, in Conaur-
TION AND AMERIcAN Pours, supra note 291, at 278, 281 (discussing the perception gap in
the views of the elites versus the public on corruption).
299 These factors, however, are less predictive than a respondent's political attitudes.
See Persily & Lammie, supra note 291, at 153-67.
300 Since the 1970s, advances in the fields of cognitive psychology, cognitive linguistics,
artificial intelligence, and anthropology have provided a persuasive account of how
humans categorize people, things, and abstract concepts. Such an account discounts the
role of deductive reasoning from abstracted principles. See generally GEoRGE LAKOFF, Wo-
MEN, FIRE, AND DANGERous THINGs: WHAT CATEGoREs REvEAL ABoUT THE MIND (1987)
(discussing the importance of categorization and describing the variety of ways in which
humans categorize). Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Campaign Contsibutions and Cormption: Com-
ments on Strauss and Cain, 1995 U. Cu. LEGAL F. 163, 164 ("Cl Oncepts such as corruption
cannot be applied satisfactorily to political life by deduction from general theoretical pro-
positions."). For a specific exploration of these insights onto the legal profession, see Sung
Hui Kim, LawyerExceptionatism in the Gatekeeping Wars, 63 SMU L. REv. 73, 95-111 (2010).
301 TaoursoN, supra note 293, at 28 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). For explo-
rations of alternative, more intuitive understandings of corruption, including those defini-
tions that emphasize the underlying psychological condition rather than the outward
behavior, see generally Kleinig & Heffernan, supra note 297; Laura S. Underkuffler, Cap-
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Thus, the classical understanding of public corruption is
groumded in the notion that private interests somehow taint the pub-
lic good. More modern definitions of corruption build on this under-
standing but tend to drop the organic metaphors of disease,
degeneration, or decay.302 They also tend to replace substance with
procedure-the notion of substantive public good is replaced by the
democratic process, which purifies private interests into legitimate
public purposes.30 Under most modern definitions, corruption in-
volves an abuse of trust occasioned by an improper commingling of
one's public role and private gain in derogation of predetermined
democratic processes-essentially, an act that disrespects the sacred
border between public and private. At minimum, there seems to be
an academic consensus that public corruption entails an "abuse of
public roles or resources for private benefit."304 In short, public cor-
ruption is the use of public office for private gain. 05 Reflecting this
tured by Evil: The Idea of Corruption in Law (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the author).
302 On the modem definitions of corruption, see THOMPSON, supra note 293, at 29.
303 SeTToursoN, supra note 293, at 28 (noting that the modern conception of corrup-
tion retains the notion of the "pollution of the public by the private" but replaces the
"consensus on the public good" with the "democratic process").
304 MichaelJohnston, Democracy Without Politics? Hidden Costs of Corruption and Reform in
America, in CORRUPTION AND AMERtCAN PoLtrics, supra note 291, at 13, 16 (emphasis
omitted).
305 See, e.g., SusAN RosE-AcKERMAN, CoRPulTIoN AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSE-
QUENCES, AND REFORM 91 (1999) (defining corruption as the "misuse of public power for
private gain"); Kleinig & Heffeman, supra note 297, at 3 ("If there is an orthodox account
of corruption, it is that it consists in the improper use of public office for private gain.");
Mark E. Warren, Political Corruption as Duplicitous Exclusion, 37 Pot. Sci. & POL 803, 803
(2006) (noting the "received conception of political corruption" as "the abuse of public
office for private gain"); WORLD BANK INSTrruE, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION INDEx, http://
info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/pdf/cc.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) ("Control of
corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for pri-
vate gain . . . .").
Three definitional issues are worth noting at the outset. First, many definitions of
corruption emphasize the "misuse" (or "abuse") of public office for private gain. That, of
course, raises the question of what counts as "misuse" versus acceptable "use." The same
concern can be alternatively refraned as involving the distinction between "improper per-
sonal gain" (which I call "private gain") and "proper personal gain," e.g., one's standard
salary and approved perquisites. For simplicity's sake, I would rather locate the disappro-
bation inherent in the term "misuse" in the term "private gain" and the critical nexus to
"public office." Hence, I define corruption simply as the use of public office for private
gain.
Second, the definition of corruption adopted here is in certain respects a narrow one-
what political scientists would categorize as individual corruption. But academics also refer
to a broader institutional (or "systemic" form of) corruption. See, e.g., TuOMrsON, supra
note 293, at 25 (distinguishing individual and institutional corruption); Michael A. Geno-
vese, The Politics of Corruption and the Coruption of Politics, in CoRuwrboN AND AMEIcAN
Potrrics, supra note 291, at 1, 3 (distinguishing individual and systemic corruption, in
which public office is used not for private gain, such as lining one's own pockets, but
political gain, such as furthering one's ideological causes, political party's fate, or even per-
sonal political ambitions). The notion of institutional (or systemic) corruption certainly
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simple core understanding, the very first page of the House Ethics
Manual commands that members, officers, and employees of the
House "should not in any way use their office for private gain."oe
Private gain. Since at least the time of Cicero, it has been "beyond
debate that officials of the government are relied upon to act for the
public interest not their own enrichment."307 But not all forms of per-
sonal enrichment are dubious. After all, members are not required to
make a vow of poverty before holding office.so8 Indeed, the Framers
endorsed the idea that members of Congress should be paid salaries
on the view that being independently wealthy should not be a qualifi-
cation for elected office.s Therefore, the notion of private gain
must recognize that some forms of personal gain3a 0 are necessary or
incidental, and thus appropriate, to performing one's political role.
As proposed by Andrew Stark, "private gain" signifies that the
public officials are enjoying the gain in question outside of their offi-
cial roles. "The modifier private suggests a kind of gain-a trip on a
corporate jet, attending an association meeting at a resort, an all-ex-
pense paid trip to a charity event-that does not, or ought not, or
need not, redound to the official as part of his or her job."311 Thus,
resonates with much of the electorate (e.g., the popular rhetoric on "corrupting" but law-
ful campaign contributions). However, there is much less consensus about what consti-
tutes institutional corruption and whether anything should be done about it. Compare
Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform 1995 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 111,
112 (criticizing the notion of institutional corruption), and David A. Strauss, What Is the
Goal of Campaign Finance Refonm, 1995 U. C. LEGAL. F. 141, 142, with LAwRENcE LEssI,
REPUBLIC, LosT: How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS-AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 226-47 (2011)
(highlighting the importance of focusing on more systemic forms of corruption, referred
to as "dependence corruption"). Consequently, trying to draw a bright line between insti-
tutional corruption and hardball politics is difficult. Thankfully, legislator insider trading
falls squarely in the more easily defined category of individual corruption. For purposes of
my analysis, I mean to emphasize private gain (as defined here) and not political gain,
which raises another set of complex questions about what constitutes the proper (and im-
proper) pursuit of political gain. See infra text accompanying notes 310-18.
Third, the definition of corruption advanced here is not coextensive with illegality.
Indeed, there may be conduct falling under my definition that is not currently illegal but
nonetheless arguably corrupt. This makes sense in light of the fact that there is almost
always a gap between prevailing cultural understandings and what the law contemporane-
ously proscribes.
so HousE Emcs MANUAL, supra note 217, at 1; see id at 185 (citing Rule 23, cl. 3 for
the proposition that the House Code of Official Conduct prohibits a House member or
other employee "from using his or her official position for personal gain").
307 JoHN T. NooNAN, Ja., BRImEs 704 (1984).
30 Cf THompsoN, supra note 293, at 50 (noting that a governor convicted of political
corruption was nevertheless "right in assuming public office is not like entering a
monastery").
309 Id.
310 By "personal gain," I mean to include gain that not only directly benefits the offi-
cial in question but also inures to the official's family or friends.
311 ANDREw STARK, CoNFUC-r o INTEREST INst AMERICAN Pusuc LiF 76 (2000) (defining
the term "private gain from public office").
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private gain is a form of personal gain that is supererogaty--neither
part of the explicit compensation allocated to the public official nor
culturally viewed as an acceptable or unavoidable perquisite of the
role.31 2 In other words, only if the personal gain in question is neither
necessary nor incidental to one's official role can the gain qualify as
private gain.313 Conversely, "[i]f the official's responsibilities required
the official to board the corporate aircraft, or be present at the associ-
ation meeting, or attend the charity event, then there would be no
'private' gain, just the exercise of office."314
From Public Office. It is not enough, however, that the gain be pri-
vate in order for the underlying act to constitute an abuse of public
office. The gain must also somehow flow from the official's public of-
fice. In other words, there must be a proximate causal nexus between
the public role and the private enrichment. At minimum, it must be
shown that the official would never have received the invitation to ride
the corporate jet, attend the association meeting at the resort, or par-
ticipate in the all-expenses paid charity event butfor her public role. If
the causal nexus is absent, the official's conduct is not improper be-
cause the opportunity did not flow from the public role. For example,
if the official can demonstrate that prior to becoming a public official
she had routinely received the same invitation to attend the all-ex-
penses paid charity event, the causal link would arguably be severed
and the alleged private gain would not be viewed as improper.315 In
addition, the official must have somehow intended"16 to receive the
gain in question in order for her conduct to be deemed improper.317
312 Two clarifications are in order. First, by referring to private gain as being "supero-
gatory," I do not suggest that private gain is in any sense virtuous, which is a common
connotation of that term. Second, the definition of "private gain" that I adopt would gen-
erally exclude longstanding explicit perquisites of congressional office because they ordi-
narily serve an important political function. For example, the proper purpose of the
franking privilege is to aid communication with constituents. However, if the franking
privilege is misused by members to for personal purposes in contravention of rules, it
would amount to "private gain" under this definition. For discussion of the franking privi-
lege, see THompsoN, supra note 293, at 73. Also, my definition of "private gain" would
exclude certain noneconomic forms of personal gain, such as enhanced prestige or in-
creased name recognition, because they are unavoidable consequences of, and thus inci-
dental to, holding office and for those reasons deemed unobjectionable.
313 For simplicity, I have chosen to locate the disapprobation that attaches to "corrup-
tion" within the definition of"private gain" and the nexus to "public office." For a further
explanation, see supma note 305.
14 Cf STARK, supra note 311, at 76 ("To then say that such private gain flows from
public office implies that the official enjoys such gain only because she happens to occupy
that official role." (emphasis added)).
315 I at 76.
316 Cf Underkuffler, supra note 301, at 9 (arguing that corruption requires "inten-
tional misconduct" (emphasis omitted)).
317 A de minimis level of intention is implied by the intentionality-laden word "use" in
the phrase "use of one's public office for private gain."
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This is merely to acknowledge that inadvertent or accidental accruals
of alleged private gain can hardly be regarded as "corrupt."31s
Even if this "private gain from public office" definition seems
plausible, some readers might object that it remains formalistic with-
out some deeper justification. After all, what is so wrong about using
one's public office for private gain such that it deserves the pejorative
label of "corruption"? Why should a public official respect the border
between public and private? What is the harm that is captured by the
phrase, "the pollution of the public by the private"?319
In some cases, the harm to the government or to the general pub-
lic will not be so clear. Take, for example, bribery in the public pro-
curement context-the classic case of private gain from public office.
One common argument that bribed officials assert is that there is no
victim.3 2 0 After all, it is certainly plausible that the bribed official
would have awarded the contract to the briber anyway, even without
the bribe.3 21 However, as has been extensively documented in the
corruption literature, private gain from public office generates certain
important but sometimes indirect harms. A full explication of the
kinds of harms is beyond the scope of this Article, but I have discussed
them elsewhere. 322 For purposes of this Article, I will briefly summa-
rize one important set of harms-the "temptation costs" incurred by
the use of public office for private gain.
When public officials-whether elected or appointed-pursue
private gain from public office, they are invariably tempted to make
decisions to advance their own financial interests without regard to
the interests of the public. This distortion of incentives risks a serious
318 Because my definition ofcorruption is not coextensive with civil or criminal illegal-
ity, I do not wish to further specify any mens rea conditions attaching to the intentionality
of conduct, as those conditions will differ depending on whether the case is civil or crimi-
nal. Moreover, it is possible that conduct can be regarded as corrupt but not unlawful.
319 The phrase comes from THompsoN, supra note 293, at 28. This is not to say that
private gain from public office is normatively problematic for consequentialist reasons
only. There may also be deontological objections to private gain from public office, which
may not be well captured by terms such as "costs" or "harms."
320 Omar Azfar et al., The Causes and Consequences of Comption, 573 ANNAus Am. AcAD.
Pot. & Soc. SQ. 42, 47 (2001).
321 Under federal law, acceptance of a bribe is illegal, regardless of whether the bribe
actually influenced the official's conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Valle, 538 F.3d 341, 346
(2008); United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d 666, 675 (2004); see also United States v. Muham-
mad, 120 F.3d 688, 693 (1997) ("[A] defendant violates [the federal antibribery statute] by
merely seeking or demanding a bribe, regardless of whether he accepts or even agrees to
accept it.").
322 See Kim, GovernmentalInsider Trading, supra note 34, at 60-61 (discussing the "temp-
tation, distraction and legitimacy costs" of public corruption in the form of governmental
insider trading and drawing linkages with findings in the political science and economic
literatures).
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misallocation of government financial resources.323 For example, em-
pirical work has found high levels of corruption to be associated with
underinvestment in education and overinvestment in public infra-
structure.324 This stems from the fact that education provides fewer
opportunities for bribes. As a result, public officials in responsible
positions tend to channel their energies toward public infrastructure
projects, where the opportunities for self enrichment are greater.325
Gradually and incrementally, the pursuit of private gain from public
office facilitates the pollution of the public by the private.
Having justified this basic definition of corruption, we can now
apply it to legislator insider trading. First, any gain arising out of trad-
ing on material, nonpublic information acquired through one's legis-
lative position clearly constitutes supererogatory financial gain-
private gain. Profits earned from insider trading are not part of the
explicit compensation allocated to members. Nor is there anything in
the job description of legislators or in the nature of their legislative
tasks that requires them to use their own personal funds to trade in
any stocks, let alone based on information gleaned through their work
in the legislature. Further, overwhelming public opinion against legis-
lator insider trading suggests that such trading is not culturally viewed
as one of the acceptable perquisites of legislators' jobs.326 Moreover,
no federal or state legislator has publicly defended this practice. In
fact, when members of Congress were directly confronted by the press
with allegations of insider trading, they reacted defensively and eva-
sively.327 Second, such trading opportunities flow from their public
office (i.e., they would not have such lucrative trading opportunities
but for the information gained by virtue of their office). Thus, legisla-
tor insider trading fits squarely within the definition of public corrup-
tion-the use of public office for private gain.
323 See, eg., KIfGAARD, supra note 296, at 38 (summarizing studies of harms of public
corruption); TANjA RABt, PRIVATE CoRurTioN AND ITS Acrons: INsoIrrs INTO THE SuBjEgc
TivE DECSION MAING PROCESSES 62-64 (2008) (discussing studies on the harms of corrupt
procurements).
324 See Rose-AcKRMAN, supra note 305, at 2-3 (summarizing findings).
325 See id.
326 A recent public opinion poll reports that the "vast majority of Americans (86%)
believe insider trading laws should be enforced against members of Congress." Newjudicial
Watch-Haris iteractive Poll Sends Warning to Washington Politicians, JumLAL WATCH (Jan. 20,
2012), http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/weekly-updates/new-poll-and-stealing-
democracy/.
327 See .g., Confanting Pelosi on Insider Trading, CBSNEws (June 17, 2012, 3:55 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504803_162-57323518-10391709/confronting-pelosi-on-
insider-trading/?tag=segementExtraScrollerhousing (discussing how no congressmen
were willing to meet with 60 Minutes reporters to discuss insider-motivated investments and




Moreover, this definitional fit is neither accidental nor merely
formal. The temptation costs that justify the basic definition clearly
apply in this domain. For example, suppose that the Chair of the
House Appropriations Committee believes that a particular military
vehicle, manufactured by a small publicly traded corporation, is ulti-
mately unsuitable for the Defense Department's purposes. But sup-
pose that he thinks it is a close call because there is no obviously
better alternative in the marketplace. Suppose further that his four
children, who are each one year apart in age, will soon be attending
college. If he advocates strongly in favor of the military vehicle, there
is a good chance that the expenditure will be approved. And if he
also purchases stock in advance, he stands to gain a hefty profit, which
could help pay for college tuition. Because of his personal financial
situation, he will be sorely tempted to advocate in favor of the military
expenditure, notwithstanding his understanding of the merits.
The above hypothetical makes clear that legislator insider trading
risks distorting the legislator's incentives and misallocating govern-
ment financial resources. And it is not just that legislators will be
tempted to cast a bad vote. Temptations, unchecked by law, are likely
to pervade all forms of legislative activity, such as making phone calls,
setting agendas, giving speeches, subpoenaing witnesses, asking ques-
tions in hearings, and so on. Indeed, entrepreneurial legislators
might more proactivelys2 s try to hustle up trading opportunities by
redirecting research resources, reorganizing their offices, and rewrit-
ing the rules of legislative ethics.3m
In sum, public corruption can plausibly be defined as the use of
public office for private gain. This definition makes sense in light of
the temptation costs incurred because of private gain from public of-
fice. And legislator insider trading not only fits the definition but also
generates these same costs. As a result, we can view and classify legisla-
tor insider trading as a form of public corruption. Now that I've de-
fended a plausible definition of (public) corruption and shown that
legislator insider trading falls within that definition, the task is to
demonstrate that one core purpose of the common law of fiduciaries
is to deter corruption.
328 For example, with respect to bribery, economic research indicates that once brib-
ery becomes pervasive in a society, government officials do not remain passive recipients of
cash but rather become active extortionists of fees. KuTGAARD, supra note 296, at 41-42.
Citizens, too, increasingly "invest their energies in the pursuit of illicit favors." Id. at 44.
329 Cf Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: Greed, Culture, and the State, 120 YAz L.J. ON
UNE 125, 135 (2010) (describing the potential effects of unchecked corruption).
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C. Fiduciary Law's Norm Against Corruption
Fiduciary law encompasses myriad contexts. As I've pointed out,
its ad hoc development and resulting fuzzy boundaries have frustrated
the legal scholars who study it. In response, scholars have earnestly
searched for unifying principles that coherently explain why certain
relationships are subject to fiduciary obligations 3 o-to partial success.
Like others,33' I doubt that a single set of principles could successfully
rationalize the various species of fiduciaries 32 without resorting to ex-
treme imprecision and risking overinclusiveness.333 As Deborah De-
Mott has explained: "The evolution of fiduciary obligation ... owed
much to the situation-specificity and flexibility that were Equity's
hallmarks.... [A]s Equity developed to correct and supplement the
common law, the interstitial nature of Equity's doctrines and func-
tions made these doctrines and functions resistant to precise defini-
tion."3 4 Cognizant of these difficulties, my goal is not to propose any
grand theory of fiduciary law. All that I seek to demonstrate is that
one core purpose of fiduciary law is anti-corruption.
Although numerous doctrines within fiduciary law appear to tar-
get corruption in the private sector,335 one particular doctrine best
illustrates an anti-corruption norm for the public context (although
certainly not limited to the public sector). In several cases, only a few
330 See, e.g., Fox-DECENT, supra noe 163, at 4; TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDuCIARY IAW 4-6
(2011); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L &
EcoN. 425, 427 (1993); Leib & Ponet, Fiduciay Representation, supra note 163, at 183; Law-
rence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L REv. 1675,
1684 (1990).
331 See, eg., FINN, supra note 133, at 1 (arguing that use of the term "fiduciary" merely
provides "a veil behind which individual rules and principles have been developed" and
that it is "meaningless to talk of fiduciary relationships as such"); DeMott, Beyond Metaphor
supra note 135, at 915 ("Described instrumentally, the fiduciary obligation is a device that
enables the law to respond to a range of situations in which, for a variety of reasons, one
person's discretion ought to be controlled because of characteristics of that person's rela-
tionship with another. This instrumental description is the only general assertion about
fiduciary obligation that can be sustained."); Sealy, supra note 129, at 73 (noting that "we
cannot proceed any further in our search for a general definition of fiduciary relationships,"
suggesting that fiduciary relationships must be defined "class by class," and positing four
categories of fiduciary relationships).
332 See Sealy, supra note 129, at 74-79, for a description of four categories of fiduciary
relationships.
333 See Frankel, supra note 147, at 797 ("The differences among fiduciaries may be so
great that treating them as a group would require a very high level of generality, rendering
a unified examination of little use.").
334 DeMott. Beyond Metaphor, supra note 135, at 881 (footnote omitted).
335 An anti-corruption norm (as applied to the private sector) is apparent in cases
which illustrate a judicial impulse against pursuing selfish gain through one's fiduciary
position. For cases restricting the fiduciary's ability to obtain or use lease renewals and
reversions, opportunities, and confidential information for selfish gain, see, for example,
Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934); Zeiden v. Oliphant, 54 N.Y.S.2d 27
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945); Keech v. Sanford, (1726) 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (Ch.) 223. For a defini-
tion of private corruption, see Kim, Governmental Insider Trading, supra note 34, at 46-48.
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of which are discussed below, courts have proscribed the use of public
office for private gain. They have done so by applying the so-called
rule against secret profits,336 which forbids fiduciaries from accepting
bribes or secret commissions.337
The rule against secret profits (or the rule against bribes and se-
cret commissions) emanates from the "exclusive benefit principle,"3 3 8
which generally requires the fiduciary "not to use her discretionary
power to arrogate to herself personal benefits from her position-
even if such benefits do not directly harm the beneficiary."339 To as-
sure this fidelity, the law provides that it is appropriate to structure the
fiduciary's compensation to promote the proper alignment of the fi-
duciary's incentives with the beneficiary's interest.34o Since a fiduci-
ary's overt compensation represents the amount thought to be
sufficient to induce the desired performance, there would be "no
need to permit an indeterminate amount of additional, covert com-
pensation."34' And not only are covert rewards viewed as unnecessary,
they are also risky to the beneficiary's interests. Therefore, it is impor-
tant "to deter those fiduciaries from even approaching the borders of
self-aggrandizing behavior."342
The following three cases nicely illustrate the anti-corruption
norm for the public context. First, consider a paradigmatic bribe in
which there is "an explicit exchange of a specific benefit for a specific
official action (or inaction)."343 Attorney-General v. Goddard, for in-
356 See Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:
THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINEss 55, 73-74 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985)
(noting that in older case law on corporate managers, courts expressed this rule as a duty
not to take "secret profits," i.e., compensation that is not "expressly provided to the manager
in the governing statutes, charter and bylaws, and employment contracts (if any)").
33 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THnD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 (2006) (prohibiting an agent from
acquiring "a material benefit from a third party in connection with transactions conducted
or other actions taken on behalf of the principal or otherwise through the agent's use of
the agent's position").
338 Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciasy Duty in Cosporate Law, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 595,601
(1997) [hereinafter Brudney, Fiduciaty Duty] (defining the "exclusive benefit principle" as
the notion "that the fiduciary's duty of loyalty requires the trustee or agent to act as the
beneficiary's (or principal's) alter ego and act only as the latter would act for himself'); see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF AGENCY § 8.01, (2006) ("An agent has a fiduciary duty to act
loyally for the principal's benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship");
RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TRUSTs § 170 (1935) (noting that the duty of a trustee is "to ad-
minister the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary").
339 Leib & Ponet, Fiduciary Representation, supra note 163, at 188-89.
340 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF AGENcy § 8.01, cmt. b (2006) ("A principal may
choose to structure the basis on which an agent will be compensated so that the agent's
interests are concurrent with those of the principal.").
M Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94
HAv. L. REv. 997, 999 (1981) (emphasis added).
342 Brudney, Fduciary Duty, supra note 338, at 602.
343 Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Btibery and the Intermediate Theory ofPolitics, 32 UCLA
L. REv. 784, 787 (1985).
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stance, involved the case of an English police sergeant who was con-
victed of accepting bribes to ignore crimes that he was responsible for
monitoring.34 In the civil case, the Crown sued to recover the pay-
ments, and the sergeant demurred.345
According to the court, the question presented was whether the
rule against secret profits in agency law applied to this case, even
though the sergeant was not entrusted with a pecuniary interest-i.e.,
the sergeant was not employed in a commercial or financial capac-
ity-and there was no pecuniary harm to the Crown.346 The court
concluded that the rule applied "because it is contrary to equity that
the agent or servant should retain money so received without the
knowledge of his master."347 After all, "this officer was employed at
this time as an agent to make inquiries and got this money in the
course of those inquiries."3a In other words, the officer received the
bribe (private gain) by reason of his position (public office). Accord-
ing to the court, it did not matter whether there was "any injury in
fact" or, more specifically, whether the principal's "pecuniary interest
is damaged in fact or not."349
In overruling the demurrer, the court emphasized that the ser-
geant's position was a fiduciary one. Specifically, the court noted that
there was a fiduciary relationship "not because he received into his
hands any property of his employers or did not, but because he was
under an obligation to use the information which he got for the pur-
pose of his employer, certainly not to use it for his own profit."ss0 In
other words, there was an expectation that the sergeant would use his
public office for the exclusive benefit of the Crown and not for private
gain.
Goddard involved a case of payment (private gain) in exchange
for an official action or, more accurately, official police inaction (from
public office). But courts have extended liability to payment in ex-
change not for any official action but simply the use of one's official
status. The frequently cited case of Reading v. Attorney-Generalo5 is il-
lustrative. In Reading, a smuggling ring paid a British army sergeant in
the Royal Army Medical Corps (stationed in Egypt) to escort contra-
band around the city of Cairo. By sitting-in full military uniform-
on the front seat of a civilian lorry loaded with the illicit cargo, the
344 Attorney-General v. Goddard, [19291 98 L.J.K.B. 743 at 744 (Eng.).
345 Id.
346 Id. at 745.
34 Id. at 746.
348 I
34 Id. at 745.
350 Id.




sergeant enabled the smugglers to pass Egyptian police lines and
avoid arrest.352 The sergeant was subsequently apprehended, court-
martialed, and imprisoned for two years.353 After his release from
prison, he brazenly brought a petition to recover the money that the
Crown seized from his apartment. 54 On appeal, the court held that
the Crown was entitled to retain the sums confiscated.355
In granting the Crown's requested remedy, the court pointed to a
pattern of cases that had employed the rule against secret profits to
recover an agent's or servant's sums, regardless of whether the master
had suffered any detriment in fact.356 This was important because
"the Crown in this case . . . has lost no profits [and] suffered no
damage." 5 7
The court went on to apply the rule to the particular facts
presented. Addressing the issue of whether the nexus to the ser-
geant's position was sufficient to warrant the remedy, the court noted
that it did not matter that the sergeant was acting outside the scope of
his employment and thus outside his official capacity when he earned
the money. Rather, what mattered was that the sergeant used his offi-
cial position to earn it:
He nevertheless was using his position as sergeant in His Majesty's
Army and the uniform to which his rank entitled him to obtain the
money which he received. In my opinion any official position,
whether marked by a uniform or not, which enables the holder to
earn money by its use gives his master a right to receive the money
so earned even though it was earned by a criminal act.358
In sum, the plurality of the court premised its holding on the
sergeant's official status, which enabled him to accept the bribe.359
Interestingly, the plurality stopped just short of expressly requiring a
fiduciary relationship to justify the remedy granted. However, it ac-
knowledged that the relationship in question was a fiduciary one in "a
wide and loose sense"3 o and, on that basis, the Crown was alterna-
tively entitled to the money.36 The concurrence was less equivocal on
this issue. It expressed agreement with the lower court that the ser-
geant "owes to the Crown a duty as fully fiduciary as the duty of a
servant to his master or of an agent to his principal,"362 despite the
352 Reading v. The King, [1948] 2 KB. 268 at 268.
5 Id at 269.
34 Reading v. Attorney General, [19511 A.C. 507 at 508.
ss Id.
356 Id. at 515.
35 Id. at 516.
358 Id. at 514.
359 Id. at 508.
360 Id at 516.
361 Id. at 508.
362 Id at 517.
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fact that the sergeant was technically neither an agent nor a servant
under the law. 65
Recall that the first case I described, Goddard, was an example of
money in exchange for an official's inaction. The second case, Read-
ing, was an example of money (private gain) in exchange for an unof-
ficial action that nevertheless exploited some official status (from
public office), as signaled by the uniform. Finally, consider, United
States v. Drummnrn 64 a case in which a breach of fiduciary duty was found
when the fiduciary neither took official action nor exploited his offi-
cial status. In Drumm, a United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) poultry inspector surreptitiously moonlighted by doing part-
time consulting for a private poultry processing plant in violation of
USDA policy.365 The federal government sued for breach of fiduciary
duty. The district court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant,
but the appellate court vacated the district court's judgment and re-
manded the case 66
In explaining its holding, the appellate court complained that
"the defendant had secretly placed himself in a position of conflicting
interests and loyalties. This he had no right to do."3 67 The court then
went on to highlight the potential harms that might arise from this
conflict of interest: by secretly accepting this second employment "in-
volving duties adverse to those he owed the government," the defen-
dant "compromised to a great extent his position as an impartial
poultry inspector and his usefulness to the government."368
Although the court claimed that the defendant's outside private
employment carried duties adverse to those owed to the government,
there was no evidence of adverseness. Indeed, the reported facts
strongly suggest that the private company was genuinely interested in
improving the quality of its poultry and hired the USDA employee to
further that purpose.369 Nothing in the factual record suggested that
the defendant was discouraged from discharging his main responsibil-
ity as a government poultry inspector-to ensure that federal stan-
dards of sanitation and wholesomeness were met by all companies
who voluntarily enrolled in the USDA's inspection program.370 The
defendant had simply earned some secret money "on the side."
363 Id. at 517 (Lord Normand, concurring).
364 329 F.2d 109 (1st Cir. 1964).
365 Id. at 109.
366 Id.
367 Id. at 112.
368 Id.
369 For example, the employee advised the company on how to handle chickens after
delivery so as to reduce contamination. "He assisted I the company] in tracking down and
eliminating the source of discoloration of ducks received by producers . . . ." Id. at 111.
370 See id. at 110-11 (describing the voluntary nature of program).
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Nevertheless, according to the court, "[t]he fact that there is no
evidence that defendant passed bad poultry or that the reputation of
the government's inspection program was damaged by defendant's
conduct would not bar recovery." 71 After all, the court went on, the
"agent has the power to conceal his fraud and hide the injury done his
principal."37 Accordingly, it would be unwise to require a showing of
actual harm where an agent acquired a "secret benefit . .. out of his
agency"** (that is, a private gain from his public office). The court
then noted the crucial importance of holding public officials to
account:
The larger interests of public justice will not tolerate, under any
circumstances, that a public official shall retain any profit or advan-
tage which he may realize through the acquirement of an interest in
conflict with his fidelity as an agent. If he takes any gift, gratuity or
benefit in violation of his duty, or acquires any interest adverse to
his principal, without a full disclosure, it is a betrayal of his trust and
a breach of confidence, and he must account to his principal for all
he has received.374
As the above three cases demonstrate-along a single, consistent
doctrinal strand-fiduciary law prohibits public fiduciaries from tak-
ing secret profits. It does so prophylactically, regardless of whether
any actual harm to the beneficiary can be shown, so long as there is a
nexus to the fiduciary's position. The underlying policy is anti-corrup-
tion, preventing private gain from public office.
If we join this insight (that fiduciary law contains an anti-corrup-
tion norm) with the prior analysis (concluding that legislator insider
trading counts as corruption), we see the appropriateness of interpret-
ing fiduciary law in a way that reaches legislators, without regard to
whether actual harm to the relevant beneficiaries can be shown. This
appeal to anti-corruption deepens the justification for analogizing leg-
islators to private trustees, directors, and partners. Moreover, this
analysis helps us see that Fuchs and PodeIl, two cases that have recog-
nized legislators-state and federal-as fiduciaries, were also targeting
corruption. In employing traditional analogical reasoning to find leg-
islators to be fiduciaries for purposes of federal insider trading law,
judges can rest assured that they are not stretching fiduciary law un-
recognizably or arbitrarily to pursue some objective that is alien to the
doctrine.
371 Id. at 113.
372 I (quoting United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 305 (1910)).
373 Id. (quoting Carter, 217 U.S. at 305).
37 1I (quoting Carter, 217 U.S. at 305).
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IV
OBJECTIONS
I have argued that courts could find that legislators owe fiduciary
duties to certain beneficiaries for purposes of federal insider trading
law. If courts impose such duties, then legislators who trade on mate-
rial, nonpublic information could be held liable under classical and
misappropriation theories. Now I will answer some objections to my
argument.3 7 5
A. Judicial Activism
Some readers may worry that this common-law-like extension of
who counts as a "fiduciary" amounts to unwarranted judicial activism.
For example, it's one thing to say that corporate insiders are fiducia-
ries of their own shareholders who happen to be on the other side of
their trades. It's quite another thing to say (as the objection goes)
that state legislators are fiduciaries of citizen-investors on the other
side of their trades. The latter seems to be a far more radical exten-
sion of fiduciary law than the former.
This concern, although understandable, loses much force when
one takes a historical view of insider trading law, examines its evolu-
tion, and appreciates how equally radical prior judicial extensions
have been. Put another way, including legislators under a "fiduciary"
label is no more activist than various other extensions that courts
made long ago and now view as uncontroversial, black-letter insider
trading law.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's original affirmation
of the classical theory of insider trading in Chiarella in 1980. At the
time, the common law tort of misrepresentation-the basis forJustice
Powell's opinion in Chiarella-provided meager support for the pro-
position that a corporate insider owes a fiduciary duty to the
375 Some of the following objections are constitutional in nature. In answering them, I
remain focused on the doctrine because the relevant constitutional objections appear not
to be overwhelming. In this type of discussion, one can always "go deeper," for example,
by interrogating competing constitutional values and policies that undergird the doctrine.
However, exploring such arguments may mislead readers into thinking thatjudges will rely
on policy considerations untethered to doctrine when evaluating these constitutional ob-
jections, which is unlikely to be the case. Moreover, exploring constitutional policy argu-
ments in depth goes far beyond the scope (and strict space constraints) of this already
lengthy Article. Suffice it to say that, for purposes of this Part, if one were inclined to
explore the underlying constitutional policies, one must take into account the perspective
that the Constitution may also contain strong anti-corruption principles. Forjust such an
argument, see Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Conuption Principle, 94 CotNEL L REV. 341
(2009). For a critique of that argument, see Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the
Scope of Profeor Teaoout's Anti-Corruption IWtncie, 107 Nw. U. L REV. 1 (2012).
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counterparty in an open-market transaction.376 Prior to Chiarella, the
weight of authority found no such duty to investors trading in the im-
personal securities markets.377 Indeed, the majority rule at the time
found no liability for insider trading executed over an anonymous ex-
change.3 78 At the time, courts opining on this issue distinguished be-
tween face-to-face transactions where, they thought, investors were
justified in relying on an insider's duty to disclose 37 and open-market
transactions where, they thought, no such justification existed because
it was impossible to know whether an insider was on the other side of
the trade. On an anonymous exchange like the New York Stock Ex-
change, there is no bargaining, and the decision to buy and the deci-
sion to sell are completely independent. As a result, in such a
transaction, it is impossible to show any reliance or injury stemming
from the insider's nondisclosure.38o
Moreover, if we go further back in time, say, to 1951, we see that
the majority rule at the time did not even impose fiduciary obligations
in many face-to-face transactions. As Richard Painter and his col-
leagues have pointed out, the so-called "majority" rule at the time
held that "officers and directors [were] subject to a fiduciary duty to
the corporation and its shareholders only in dealings with or on be-
half of the corporation."38' Hence, in most jurisdictions, officers and
directors could "trade freely in the stock of their own corporation in
376 See A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law andjustice PoweWs Legacy
for the Law ofInsider Trading 78 B.tJ. L. REv. 13, 22 (1998) (noting that "the common law of
deceit provides scant support for [the position in CareUlla that a corporate insider de-
frauds a shareholder" when the insider simply trades on the open market); see also Good-
win v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (Mass. 1933) (holding that directors do not "occupy the
position of trustee toward individual stockholders" and that there was "no fiduciary rela-
tion between them and the plaintiff in the matter of the sale of his stock" (quoting Blabon
v. Hay, 169 N.E. 268, 271 (Mass. 1929))).
37 See Pritchard, supra note 376, at 23.
378 To be sure, a minority of courts eventually came to adopt the "special facts" doc-
trine, in which special circumstances can render an insider's silence in a face-to-face trans-
action unconscionable and thus warrant the imposition of a duty of full disclosure. That
said, cases adopting this doctrine are easily distinguishable from transactions over imper-
sonal exchanges. See id. at 25 (distinguishing special facts doctrine from other cases); see
also Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 434 (1909) (creating the special facts doctrine). While
there were a few states which required disclosure of nonpublic information to shareholders
even in the absence of special circumstances, they did so only for face-to-face transactions,
which are thus distinguishable from stock market transactions. See Anabtawi, supra note
106, at 865 (citing Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232 (Ga. 1903)).
3 See Alison Grey Anderson, Frand, Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 HosTRA L. REv.
341, 366-67 (1982) ("Silence by a fiduciary is fraudulent primarily because the beneficiary
is likely to interpret that silence in a face-to-face transaction as meaning that the fiduciary is
aware of no additional material information.").
380 LANGEVOORT, suPra note 42, § 2:3, at 2-6 ("Given the essential independence of
buyer and seller decisions, causation and injury flowing from any nondisclosure are diffi-
cult to trace.").
381 Painter, Krawiec & Williams, supra note 43, at 162 n.34 (citing Louis Loss, SEcUIu-
iEs REGULATION 824 (1st ed. 1951)).
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an individual capacity without any affirmative disclosure obligation, so
long as they did not engage in active misrepresentations or half-
truths."s82 Therefore, as long as they traded stock in their own account
and not in their representative capacities, officers and directors did
not owe fiduciary duties of disclosure to the shareholders of their
corporation.383
Even if we accept as uncontroversial the proposition that corpo-
rate insiders owe fiduciary duties to individual shareholders when
trading on an exchange, there was almost no common law support for
the proposition that a corporate insider owed a special duty to purchas-
ers and not just sellers of the company's shares." 4 Unless purchasing
investors already own company shares, they are not current but pro-
spective shareholders of the company. Therefore, it is the consumma-
tion of the particular transaction with the insider that brings the
investor into a fiduciary relation with the insider. Accordingly, before
that transaction is completed, purchasers are mere strangers to the
corporate insider.
The Supreme Court's only response to the problem presented by
the common law was to quote Judge Learned Hand:
[T]he director or officer assumed a fiduciary relation to the buyer
by the very sale; for it would be a sorry distinction to allow him to
use the advantage of his position to induce the buyer into the posi-
tion of a beneficiary although he was forbidden to do so once the
buyer had become one. 8 5
Judge Hand's statement, although characteristically eloquent, is not
an argument. After all, the "sorry distinction" is grounded in corpo-
rate law, which has historically treated shareholders and nonshare-
holders differently. Moreover, this "sorry distinction" was the
prevailing law of the day. 38 6
There are more examples ofjudicial extensions that we currently
view to be normal, indeed banal, but that at one time may have been
controversial. For example, for centuries, courts did not regard ordi-
nary employees as fiduciaries because they exercised very little discre-
tionary authority and did not ordinarily occupy positions of trust and
382 Id. (emphasis added).
383 Of course, even at the time, this majority rule was slowly giving way to the minority
view that "corporate insiders are subject to a fiduciary duty when dealing with shareholders
of their corporation and thus must make full disclosure of all material facts." Id. Also,
according to Louis Loss, the majority rule had merged into the "special facts" doctrine. Id.
384 See Pritchard, supra note 376, at 26.
385 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (quoting Gratz v. Claughton, 187
F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951)).
386 As Adam Pritchard notes, "[a] Ithough this distinction may be 'sorry,' it is the com-
mon law rule." Pritchard, supra note 376, at 26.
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confidence toward their employer.387 This changed somewhat in the
twentieth century when a number of cases began extending the fiduci-
ary status to mere employees,m although even today not all states
hold that employees are presumptively fiduciaries.38 9 However, it is
now clear that courts deem administrative employees to be fiduciaries
for purposes of federal insider trading law.390 Indeed, courts have
held a secretary,39 a copyholder for a financial printer,39 2 and an aide
in the audio-visual department39 3 to be fiduciaries under insider trad-
ing law.
Of course, one could flip this evidence around to lament that we
are on a slippery slope towards ever-expanding insider trading liability
and that we must draw the proverbial line in the sand here and now,
with legislators. But such a plea presumes that the expansions in the
past and the expansion at issue here have been bad ones. Until that
substantive case has been made, suffice it to say that, for purposes of
this objection, legislator insider trading is normatively problematic for
387 See e.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 1934) ("A mere
employee of a corporation does not ordinarily occupy a position of trust or confidence
toward his employer unless he is also an agent in respect to the matter under considera-
tion."); Palmer v. Cypress Hill Cemetery, 25 N.E. 983, 985 (N.Y. 1890) ("The plaintiff was
not a trustee at the time the contract with him was made, and his relation . . . was not
fiduciary, but was that of an employe e] . . . .").
388 See, e.g., Brophy v. Cities Sery. Co., 70 A.2d 5.7 (Del. Ch. 1949) (holding that when
an employee obtains secret information, the employee assumes a position of trust within
the company); Essex Trust Co. v. Enwright, 102 N.E. 441, 443 (Mass. 1913) (compelling
employee to assign a lease to detriment of his employer).
389 Se, eg., ATC Distrib. Grp. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402
F.3d 700, 715 (6th Cir. 2004) ("[U]nlike 'mere' employees, officers of a company may be
presumed to have a fiduciary relationship to the company on that basis alone . . . .");
TalentBurst, Inc. v. Collabera, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 261, 265-66 (D. Mass. 2008) (noting
that in Massachusetts, an employee must occupy a position of trust and confidence in or-
der to warrant fiduciary duties); Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmrt. Co. v. McLane, 503 S.E.2d 278,
281 (Ga. 1998) ("The employee-employer relationship is not one from which the law will
necessarily imply fiduciary obligations. . . "). Some states require that an employee be a
"key employee" in order to be fiduciary. See, e.g., Burbank Grease Servs. v. Sokolowski, 717
N.W.2d 781, 796 (Wis. 2005) ("If the employee is a 'key employee,' then a fiduciary duty of
loyalty will exist.").
$oo See e.g., United States v. Larrabee, 240 F.3d 18, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) (affirming liabil-
ity of law firm's director of fiduciary services under misappropriation theory); SEC v.
Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 438-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding law firm's office-services man-
ager to be a fiduciary for purposes of tipping liability).
391 See SEC v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d 508, 522-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding an execu-
tive's secretary to be a fiduciary under misappropriation theory); Brophy, 70 A.2d at 7
(holding that a secretary occupies "a position of trust and confidence toward the corpora-
tion, with respect to the information so acquired, and the purchase of its stock for his own
account was a breach of the duty he owed to" the corporation).
392 SEC v. Materia, No. 82 Civ. 6225, 1983 WL 1396, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), a#'4 745
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
393 SEC v. Trikilis, No. CV 92-1336-RSWL(EEX), 1992 WL 301398, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July
28, 1992). vacated, Civ. A. No. 92 1336-RSWL(EEX), 1993 WL 43571 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22,
1993).
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the same reasons that public corruption is problematic, as I have ar-
gued more extensively elsewhere. 94 As for general anxiety about judi-
cial activism, I explained in Part III.C that we can justify extending the
category of "fiduciary" to include legislators by reference to a policy
that is central to fiduciary law.395
In sum, the extension that I am calling for is no more radical
than prior extensions made under Rule lOb-5, which the Supreme
Court once referred to as a "judicial oak which has grown from little
more than a legislative acorn."396 It is certainly no more radical than
the judicially implied private cause of action under Rule lOb-5 or the
judicial creation of the insider trading causes of actions under the
classical and misappropriation theories. I am not asking for the crea-
tion of a brand new cause of action against legislators. I am merely
advocating that, should a court find itself in the position to so hold,
legislators could be recognized as fiduciaries under the already ex-
isting insider trading cause of action.
B. Federalism
Nevertheless, is there something especially problematic-perhaps
constitutionally-with applying federal insider trading law to state leg-
islators? One might object that applying the federal securities laws to
target the public corruption of state legislators (even if it is in the form
of legislator insider trading) represents an unconstitutional exercise
of federal power-an invalid federal "incursion on traditional state
power"397 (i.e., the power to police the conduct of its own officials).
But, as a doctrinal matter, this objection is not tenable given the fact
that since the 1980s, the federal government has successfully prose-
cuted thousands of state and local officials for acts of corruption.398
Further, many such prosecutions were based on federal statutes that
have not only survived constitutional scrutiny 9 but also were jurisdic-
tionally rooted in the Commerce Clause40 0-the same constitutional
394 See Kim, Goverunmental Insider Trading, supra note 34, at 61.
395 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
396 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
397 George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption?-Mail Fraud, State Law and
Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 ConsEu. L. REv. 225, 250 (1997) (discussing the United States v.
Lopez Court's concern with protecting traditional state police power).
3e8 See George D. Brown, New Federalism's Unanswered Question: Who Should Prosecute State
and Local Officials for Political Corruption?, 60 WAsH. & LEE. L. REv. 417, 421 (2003).
399 See Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State
and Local Officials, 62 S, CAL. L. REv. 367, 370 (1989) (stating that the constitutionality of
statutes prosecuting state and local officials for corruption is well established).
400 See id (noting that Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute, the
Travel Act, and the Hobbs Act were all grounded in the Commerce Clause and survived
constitutional challenge). Public officials are also prosecuted under the federal mail fraud
statutes, which are grounded in the postal power.
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grounding for the federal securities laws, including the insider trading
prohibition.
And there should be little doubt that the federal insider trading
prohibition rests on constitutionally secure footing. First, unlike the
few federal statutes that have been invalidated on federalism
grounds,40 Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 (as does the whole of fed-
eral securities laws) 4 0 2 regulate what is clearly economic activity involv-
ing "instrumentalities of interstate commerce"40 3 and thus
substantially relates to interstate commerce.,0 Hence, the relevant
statute indisputably falls within the federal commerce power. Second,
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 both contain express jurisdictional ele-
ments that require the trier of fact to find a nexus with interstate corn-
merce.405 This ensures, through a case-by-case inquiry, that the
activity in question is connected to interstate commerce.** Third, the
insider trading prohibition does not commandeer state resources,
which would be intrusive to state power; "it neither requires the states
to do anything nor imposes any financial burden on them."40
Fourth, as my arguments have suggested, the federal ban on insider
trading is nondiscriminatory and generally applicable; the same legis-
lation applies equally to public officials and private parties.40 There-
fore, the use of federal securities laws to target legislator insider
401 Se e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (civil damages provision of
the Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Gun-Free
School Zones Act).
402 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate
Law. 58 VAND. L REv. 1573, 1585 n.29 (2005), for a discussion on the constitutionality of a
hypothetical complete federal displacement of state corporate law. It goes without saying
that if Congress has the power to displace state corporate law in its entirety, Congress
certainly has the power to regulate insider trading in its entirety.
403 Ryan K Stumphauzer, Note, Electronic Impdses, Digital Signals, and Federal jurisdic-
tion: Congress's Commerce Clause Power in the TwentyFinst Centusy, 56 VAND. L REv. 277, 289
(2003). For a discussion of some lower courts' broad readings of the phrase "instrumental-
ity of interstate commerce," see id. at 312-13.
404 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 ("Congress' commerce authority includes the power to
regulate those activities having a substantial relationship to interstate commerce . . . .").
405 Section 10(b)'s prohibitions apply when a defendant uses "any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange." 15 U.S.C. § 78j. Likewise, Rule lOb-5 provides that it is unlawful "for any per-
son, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce . . ." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5.
406 Cf Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (striking down part of the statute because "it contains no
jurisdictional element which would ensure" that the prohibited activity affects interstate
commerce).
407 John C. Coffee. Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration ofthe Public/Pivate Distinction,
35 Am. Caum. L. Rev. 427,454-55 (1998) (observing that federal anti-corruption legislation
does not easily offend the anti-commandeering principle of New Yor v. United States).
408 See id at 455 (suggesting that Justice O'Connor created an exception to the federal-
ism limits imposed in New Ybrk v. United States for legislation that "subjected a state to the
same legislation applicable to private parties").
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trading at the subnational level should survive federalism-based
challenges.
C. Speech or Debate Clause
The final major objection, which applies only to members of Con-
gress and is relevant notwithstanding the STOCK Act, concerns the
Speech or Debate Clause, which reads in part: "for any Speech or De-
bate in either House, [members of Congress] shall not be questioned
in any other Place."409 This Clause immunizes members of Congress
from civil or criminal liability for "conduct necessary to perform their
duties within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity."4x0 Such ac-
tivity includes, for example, speech or debate in either House, voting,
drafting committee reports, and conduct at legislative committee
hearings.41' This Clause was designed to foster legislative indepen-
dence and to avoid coercion or intimidation from the executive or
judicial branches of government. 412 In addition to securing the inde-
pendence of the legislature, the Clause "serves the additional function
of reinforcing the separation of powers so deliberately established by
the Founders."413
The scope of the liability immunity is, however, not all encom-
passing. And the Speech or Debate Clause was not intended "simply
for the personal or private benefit of Members of Congress, but to
protect the integrity of the legislative process."41 4 As such, the immu-
nity only "protects Members against prosecutions that directly im-
pinge upon or threaten the legislative process."415 Thus, the actions
that are protected "must be an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes by which Members participate in committee
and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage
4o9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; seeJoHN E. NowAK& RONALD D. RoTUNDA, TREATISE ON
CONsTirrTIONAL LAw 305-12 (8th ed. 2010) (explaining the history of the Speech or De-
bate Clause and the cases interpreting it). Of course, if a state constitution has a similar
clause, some of this analysis may cross-apply. Cf., e.g., Wilkins v. Gagliardi, 556 N.W.2d 171,
176-77 (Mich. App. 1996) ("The Speech or Debate Clause of the Michigan Constitution is
substantially similar to that of the United States Constitution . . . .").
410 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 235 n.11 (1979) (quoting Eastland v. United States
Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
411 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624-25 (1972).
412 See e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972) (noting that the Foun-
ders designed the Clause to foster legislative independence); Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616 ("The
Speech or Debate Clause was designed to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide
freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without intimidation or threats from the Ex-
ecutive Branch."); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1966) ("[The Clause]
prevent[]s intimidation by the executive .. .").
413 Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178. For separate exploration of general separation of powers
principles, see supra note 35.
414 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 507.
415 Gravel 408 U.S. at 616.
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or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters
which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either
House." 4 1 6
To be clear, the Speech or Debate Clause does not grant blanket
immunity to members of Congress and does not convert them into
"super-citizens" above the law.4 1 7 As the Supreme Court explained:
Article 1, § 6, d. 1, as we have emphasized, does not purport to con-
fer a general exemption upon Members of Congress from liability
or process in criminal cases. Quite the contrary is true. While the
Speech or Debate Clause recognizes speech, voting, and other legis-
lative acts as exempt from liability that might otherwise attach, it
does not privilege either Senator or aide to violate an otherwise
valid criminal law in preparing for or implementing legislative
aCtS. 418
Accordingly, notwithstanding the Clause, members of Congress have
been prosecuted for fraud,419 bribery,420 extortion, 421 violation of
honorarium laws,4 2 2 and embezzlement.423
There is no reason to treat the trading of securities (in violation
of federal law) any differently. Such trades are not integral to the
legislative process and thus do not constitute any part of "legitimate
legislative activity" that warrants protection under the Speech or De-
bate Clause. In most cases, legislator insider trading will not involve
the making of any speech in Congress, the casting of any vote, or the
writing of any report-core legislative actions that the Constitution
shields from prosecutorial scrutiny. Instead, insider trading will in-
volve a market trade made privately, intentionally without fanfare, and
on the basis of material, nonpublic information. The fact that such
416 IL at 625.
417 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516; see id. at 520 (rejecting "sweeping claims [that] would
render Members of Congress virtually immune from a wide range of crimes simply because
the acts in question were peripherally related to their holding office").
418 Gravel 408 U.S. at 626.
419 United States v.Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966) ("No argument is made, nor do
we think that it could be successfully contended, that the Speech or Debate Clause reaches
conduct, such as was involved in the attempt to [illegally] influence the Department of
justice [and thereby defraud the United States], that is in no wise related to the due func-
tioning of the legislative process."). The Court did hold, however, that with respect to a
conspiracy charge that turned on dissecting both the text and motivation for a speech that
Johnson made during the legislative process, the Speech or Debate Clause would prevent
prosecution. Id. at 173-77. The Court was careful to guard against overreading. It ex-
plained, "[o]ur decision does not touch a prosecution which, though as here founded on a
criminal statute of general application, does not draw in question the legislative acts of the
defendant member of Congress or his motives for performing them." Id. at 185.
420 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 501 (prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(c)(1), (g)); United
States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283, 283 (3d Cir. 1994).
421 United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1012 (9th Cir. 2011).
422 Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wright, 777 F. Supp. 525, 527 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
423 United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1302-04 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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information is obtained through some connection to Congress does
not mean that trading on such information suddenly becomes a legiti-
mate or official act of Congress. 424
United States v. Brewster"-5 provides a useful precedent.426 Brew-
ster, a former Senator, was prosecuted for violating various federal
anti-bribery laws. The Supreme Court wrote:
Taking a bribe is, obviously, no part of the legislative process or
function; it is not a legislative act. It is not, by any conceivable inter-
pretation, an act performed as a part of or even incidental to the
role of a legislator. It is not an act resulting from the nature, and in
the execution, of the office. Nor is it a thing said or done by him, as
a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that
office .. 2. 7
Just as a bribe is not a legislative act, neither is insider trading. The
Court also wisely observed that if the goal of the Speech or Debate
Clause is legislative independence, then allowing bribes would
threaten independence far more than permitting criminal
prosecutions.4 2 8
In addition to providing liability immunity for legislative acts,
however, the Speech or Debate Clause provides a testimonial and an
evidentiary privilege.429 So, even if liability immunity is not available
to a member, a member could decline to testify's0 based on the privi-
lege, and evidence regarding legislative acts or their underlying moti-
424 Cf Brewser 408 U.S. at 528 ("The Speech or Debate Clause does not prohibit in-
quiry into illegal conduct simply because it has some nexus to legislative functions.")
425 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
426 Cf Bainbridge, Inside the Altway, supra note 9, at 303 n.153 (comparing legislator
insider trading to legislator bribery under Brewster and stressing that both fall outside the
scope of legislative activity).
427 Brewster; 408 U.S. at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 512 ("A legis-
lative act has consistently been defined as an act generally done in Congress in relation to
the business before it.").
428 See id. at 524-25 ("But financial abuses by way of bribes, perhaps even more than
Executive power, would gravely undermine legislative integrity and defeat the right of the
public to honest representation."); Bainbridge, Inside theBeltway, supra note 9, at 303 ("[B]y
removing the perverse incentives such trading opportunities create, the legislative process
would be enhanced.").
429 United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1031 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that certain
exhibits and emails that discussed status of actual legislation should have been excluded
from the grand jury based on these privileges). For the justification of this holding, see
generally id. at 1020, 1035 n.27 (describing three distinct protections-liability immunity,
testimonial privilege, and evidentiary privilege). Whether the Clause creates also a nondis-
closure privilege applicable against the Executive Branch is in dispute. Compare United
States v. Rayburn House, 497 F.3d 654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding the privilege), with
Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1034 (rejecting the privilege).




vation could be excluded from grand and petit juries or at trial.4a
This could impede prosecutorial efforts because proof of a breach of
fiduciary duty would ordinarily require some showing that the mem-
ber somehow obtained the nonpublic information in question by rea-
son of the member's connection to Congress. That, in turn, could
require tracing the provenance of the information to the member's
performance of a legislative act,4 32 e.g., the member's attendance at a
subcommittee briefing in which the information in question was con-
veyed. Thus, a court could exclude evidence establishing the mem-
ber's presence at a critical briefing (e.g., a transcript of the briefing)
on the grounds that such evidence refers to a legislative act that is
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.433 Indeed, in United States
v. Swindal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed certain
indictments against a congressman where the evidence solicited by
the prosecution attempted to establish the congressman's membership
in certain congressional committees.434
That said, there will be many occasions in which the relevant in-
formation will not have been obtained in the course of a member's
performance of a legislative act. For example, the member may ac-
quire the information while the member was engaged in so-called po-
litical activities, which do not fall within the core conduct protected by
the Speech or Debate Clause. These activities include a "wide range
of legitimate 'errands' performed for constituents, the making of ap-
pointments with Government agencies, assistance in securing Govern-
431 See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1979) (holding that evidence
that refers to a member's legislative act or inquiries into the motivation behind a legislative
act may not be introduced in a government prosecution). It is not entirely clear whether a
member can waive the Speech or Debate Clause. See id at 490-91 (holding that if waiver is
possible, it "can be found only after explicit and unequivocal renunciation of the protec-
tion," but not deciding the question of its possibility).
432 See United States. v. Renzi, 686 F. Supp. 2d 956, 971 (D. Ariz. 2010) (referring to
the definition of "legislative act" as "an act generally done in Congress in relation to the
business before it ... or things said or done ... as a representative, in the exercise of the
functions of that office" (quoting Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
43 Although neither pure speech nor debate, a member's attendance at congressional
hearings, briefings, or debates nonetheless is necessary to performing all other legislative
functions that are clearly protected by the Clause, such as voting or preparing committee
reports. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that "congressional efforts to
inform itself through committee hearings are part of the legislative function." Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 132-133 (1979).
434 United States v. Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1992). The prosecution
presented the evidence relating to the Congressman's membership status in certain com-
mittees for the purpose of supporting an inference that the Congressman had "unique and
specific knowledge" of certain statutory provisions. The establishment of such knowledge
was critical to the prosecution's case of perjury. See id. at 1542. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the Court declined to dismiss the other indictments, where the prosecution es-
tablished the requisite evidence with reference to a legislative act. See id. (declining to
dismiss Count Five).
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ment contracts, preparing [newsletters] to constituents, news releases,
and speeches delivered outside the Congress." 35
To take a concrete example, imagine that a member meets with a
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) official on behalf of a constitu-
ent to discuss the agency's dealings with the constituent. During the
meeting, the FDA official tells the member in confidence that the
FDA intends to approve a potential blockbuster drug, manufactured
by a particular publicly held pharmaceutical company. If the member
trades on such information, the Speech or Debate Clause should pose
no obstacle for the prosecution's case. Of course, the resolution of
any particular case will turn on the specific facts. Suffice it to say that
there will be many cases in which the member obtained the informa-
tion via a sufficiently close nexus to the member's official position to
justify imposing the insider trading prohibition.
Finally, it should be noted that the Speech or Debate Clause does
not immunize members of Congress from ordinary criminal process,
including properly issued search warrants, even of congressional of-
fices.45 6 In sum, the Speech or Debate Clause creates no substantive
liability immunity because insider trading is not a legitimate legislative
activity. It may, however, create some evidentiary difficulties, depend-
ing on the type of evidence sought.437
CONCLUSION
Legislators, federal and state, are not statutorily exempted from
federal insider trading law. Instead, the reason why federal insider
trading law is thought not to apply to them is because legislators are
thought not to be fiduciaries to anyone. But as I have argued, that
majority view is mistaken. Judges could have and still can find legisla-
tors to be fiduciaries to the people, the legislature (and fellow legisla-
tors), and the government that they serve. In support, I have
provided relevant cases and also plausible analogies to the private trus-
tee, the director, and the partner. Even more, I have explained that
those analogies are justified because they further an underlying policy
of fiduciary law stopping corruption. Finally, I have demonstrated
that there are no overwhelming objections, although prosecutors may
435 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512. Also, in Gravel, the Court held that the lobbying of execu-
tive branch officials, though generally done, was not protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause because such activity was "beyond the legislative sphere." 408 U.S. at 625-26. In
addition, promiws to perform a legislative act are not protected by the Clause. See Heltoski,
442 U.S. at 489.
436 See NowAr & ROTUNDA, supra note 409, at 312-13.
437 In addition, the Privilege from Arrest Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6, is inapplicable
because the privilege is limited to protection from civil arrest, which is now an obsolete
practice. See NowAr & ROTUNDA, supra note 409, at 312; Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway,
supra note 9, at 302.
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face evidentiary obstacles in making their case, as posed by the Speech
or Debate Clause.
It is tempting to think that all of this is academic given the pas-
sage of the STOCK Act. But that Act addresses the majority view only
for members of Congress. The conventional wisdom that legislators
are not fiduciaries remains intact for the more than seven thousand
state legislators in service. Worse, the Act's passage may solidify and
canonize this mistaken understanding of fiduciary law and thereby of
federal insider trading law, with unintended consequences. Thus, it
still matters that judges get federal insider trading law right.
